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The Walt Disney Company’s meticulously-crafted corporate mythos, as it developed in 
the mid-twentieth century, hid a conflicted history of anti-New Deal, nationalist ideology that 
was popularized during the clashes of the Hollywood labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s.  
In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act was passed as Disney’s Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs (1937) entered full-scale production, and each were central to the labor-management 
conflict that lurked behind the scenes of the motion picture industry. By the mid-1940s, 
following the conclusion of the Second World War, Congress passed the Labor Management 
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act and imposed a series of restrictions on U.S. labor organizations, 
including those in Hollywood. Compounding matters further, Hollywood’s elite and the federal 
government alleged that the specter of Communism had infiltrated major motion picture studios. 
In 1947, Walt Disney, among several others in the film industry, placed their fears on record 
before the House Un-American Activities Committee. 
The biographies of men like Walt Disney have continued to dominate historical 
discussions related to U.S. industry and cultural production respectively. To date, however, there 
has been a peculiar disinterest in the artists and laborers who toiled behind the scenes of the U.S. 
filmmaking industry. This inattention to those artists has created noticeable gaps in the 
historiography of U.S. labor, more generally. In an effort to elevate the voices of Hollywood’s 
working class, this project places various primary sources, including organizational records, 
 
artwork, and oral history interviews in conversation with corporate and government sources. This 
thesis deconstructs the mythmaking carried out by the Walt Disney Company, and places the 
animation studio’s history at the intersection of U.S. labor organization and the proliferation of 
anti-New Deal ideology. This study argues that Walt Disney’s status as successful Hollywood 
industrialist, asset of the federal government, and rabid anti-New Dealer fueled his campaign to 
demonize the organizational efforts of his artists and depict their assertions of federally-
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 First and foremost, I would like to recognize my first college professor in history, Melissa 
Bailey. As an ice-breaker at the beginning of two semesters, she asked us what we wanted to be 
when we “grew up.” Smugly, I responded that I wanted to stay a student forever because that 
meant I would never have to grow up.  Seven years later, I can safely say that I gave it the old 
college try.  
 I would like to thank my Advisor and Committee Chair, John Weber. Rather than run for 
the hills when I first pitched the topic, he did what modern historians do: he demonstrated 
empathy and got his hands a little dirty with me. I knew Dr. Weber had placed his faith in me 
when he doubled down by recommending readings and helping me tame my insufferable 
polemic. I truly appreciate his spending time with me, be it to let out an audible groan as I 
presented him with yet another whimsical metaphor, or just to share a restrained chuckle because 
“John Weber is everywhere.”  
 Additionally, I benefited from guidance and constructive criticism offered by Elizabeth 
Zanoni and Brett Bebber, the other two-thirds of my Defense Committee. Whether I was delving 
into the histories of American pizza’s robber barons, chasing Dead Rabbits through Five Points, 
or hunting for other rodents in the archives, I could always trust that Dr. Zanoni would partake in 
my food for thought. Hopefully, the duck was roasted to her liking. That leaves the allusion to 
pixie dust for Dr. Bebber. From my first introduction to historical methodology proper to his 
being one of the final signatures on this thesis in the eleventh hour, he has been one of the 
greatest academic cheerleaders ever. Does that make sense? These mentors, in addition to those 
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too numerous to mention, have provided me with an endless supply of happy thoughts 
throughout my post-secondary education. 
 Equally important, however, were the numerous researchers, librarians, and archival staff 
who maintain the special collections that provided me assistance me in “animating the past.” I 
am deeply indebted John Canemaker for allowing me to browse his research and oral interviews 
housed by the Fales Library and Special Collections at New York University.  I found myself 
just as welcomed by Adam Berenbak of the National Archives in Washington, D.C. I am 
especially grateful for the Southern California Library for Social Studies Research, California 
State University – Northridge, and the University of California – Los Angeles for granting me 
permission to include several of the figures used to illustrate portions of my research. The 
wisdom imparted on me by Michele Welsing of the Southern California Library as well as Molly 
Haigh and Teresa Barnett of UCLA were instrumental to my project’s success.  
 Lastly, but certainly not in the least, I thank my family for enduring this whole ordeal. 
My father, Ed, never stopped reminding me of how proud I made him and asking when I was 
going to graduate, for real; my two daughters, Taylor and Olivia, inspired me in ways I would 
have never imagined; but my wife, Kaydee, probably deserves the most credit—and perhaps an 
honorary doctorate in one of the so-called hard sciences: “Bradleyology.” It was Kaydee who 
cleaned up after me, as I littered our home with illegible notes and dog-eared books; it was 
Kaydee who put me into check during my innumerable temper tantrums; and it was also Kaydee 
who thanklessly poured over every word of this thesis, from first to final draft. Our “happily ever 
after” was not supposed to have so much required reading, and for that, I apologize. To borrow a 
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The title and theme of this thesis, “in-betweening Disney,” pay homage to animators—
past and present—and a double entendre.1 The process of in-betweening, in the literal sense, was 
performed by those near the bottom of the labor hierarchy at Walt Disney’s fabled cartoon 
factory. By the late-1930s, the process of hand-drawn animation, arguably perfected at Walt 
Disney Productions, Ltd. (WDP), relied on a stratification of labor in order to maximize its 
output while maintaining quality. At the pinnacle of this hierarchy were the lead animators. 
These were men tasked with creating the “key, or extreme drawing[s] for a particular character.”2 
Next, were the breakdown men. As their title implied, they were responsible for “break[ing] 
down the action,” to maintain an animation unit’s “efficiency.”3 At the bottom rungs of the 
animation hierarchy, just above the gendered work of the Ink and Paint Department, one would 
find the overworked and underpaid in-betweeners.4 They were responsible for one of the most 
labor-intensive and thankless tasks at Disney’s studio and often received the lowest 
																																								 																				
1 For the purposes of disambiguation, Walt Disney has been generally referred to herein by his last name. His last 
name, however, has sometimes been used to describe any and all things “Disney” (e.g. his brother: Roy, the 
company they built together, etc.). Great effort has been taken to distinguish between meanings, but the researcher 
apologizes in advance for any subsequent lack of clarity. 
2 Although this is an oversimplification of the process, see: Walt Disney Productions, Ltd., Information about the 
Walt Disney Animation Department, n.d., John Canemaker Animation Collection, Fales Library and Special 
Collections, New York University Libraries, truncated herein as “JCAC.” 
3 Information about the Walt Disney Animation Department. 
4 As noted by Tom Sito, former President of the Motion Picture Screen Cartoonist’s Guild, Local 839 (formerly the 
Local 852), animation historian, and Disney animator, most “ink-and-paint departments were jokingly referred to as 
‘hen houses’,” whereas Disney’s ink-and-painters had dubbed their department “Tehachapi, after a California 
women’s prison,” see: Tom Sito, Drawing the Line: The Untold Story of the Animation Unions from Bosko to Bart 
Simpson (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 26. 
2 
compensation. In-betweening required great skill and concentration, and this repetitive labor was 
necessary in order to depict fluid and organic movement in animated pictures.  
Scenes including key events and/or figures, animated without adequate in-between work 
would appear unnatural to audiences. Paradoxically, in-betweeners were considered a disposable 
resource, yet the product of their labor was indispensable. In the context of the present research, 
this process of “in-betweening” has been appropriated to describe a re-examination of key events 
and figures, in order to correct a series of historical omissions concerning Disney’s corporate 
record between 1935 and 1947. In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was signed 
into law by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. More commonly known as the Wagner Act, 
the NRLA called for the formation of a board of government adjudicators, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), to handle labor-management disputes.5 As the Wagner Act passed 
constitutional muster in the courts, Walt Disney’s animation studio had begun an industrial-scale 
animation project, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937). Critical acclaim for the latter 
achievement belied Disney’s contempt for the former.  
A labor-management crisis was brewing at Disney’s cartoon factory.6 The rigorous 
working conditions required for Snow White—a feature-length, hand-drawn animated film— 
exacerbated tensions at the studio. Disillusionment among the industrial artists employed by 
Disney began to bear poisonous fruit.  Many animators began to reject the representation offered 
by the Federation of Screen Cartoonists (FSC), a company-controlled union meant to limit self-
																																								 																				
5 James A. Gross, The Reshaping of the National Labor Relations Board: National Labor Policy in Transition, 
1937-1947 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981). 
6 Disney’s labor struggles have been well documented by so many of his critics that this statement hardly needs 
qualification. Nevertheless, see: Richard Schickle, The Disney Version: The Life, Times, Art and Commerce of Walt 
Disney, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1997), 247-62; Steven Watts, The Magic Kingdom: Walt Disney and 
the American Way of Life (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997) 204-27; Sito, Drawing the Line, 
101-51. 
3 
organization among those employed by WDP. In response to the artists’ attempts to assert their 
constitutionally-guaranteed right to organize their own union, Disney grew incredulous and 
began publicly berating his employees for daring to question his paternalistic benevolence.  
In February 1941, Disney held mass meetings at his studio on Hyperion Boulevard.7 
During these meetings, Walt reminded his employees that he had once been a starving artist too, 
but he was able to pull himself up by the bootstraps and made the sacrifices necessary to ensure 
the enterprise he and his brother built would become self-sustaining. Disney had also set his 
sights on the labor leaders inside his studio, as they attempted to form an independent unit under 
the banner of the newly-organized Motion Picture Screen Cartoonists Guild (SCG). Art Babbitt, 
a talented, spirited, and charismatic animator, eventually had his contract terminated for 
appearing too radical and subversive.  
The SCG had allied itself with Herbert K. Sorrell, a career union organizer who became 
involved with Hollywood’s labor movement by joining the International Brotherhood of Painters 
while employed by Universal Studios during the 1920s. In a response to corruption in the 
International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Entertainers (IATSE), Sorrell and his painter 
brethren went on strike in April 1937. They elected him “Picket Captain” for the demonstrations 
at the Warner Brothers Studio because of his “experience in the shipyard strike in Oakland,” 
when he and other longshoremen “turned over the patrol wagons” of local police officers.8  
Early in 1941, in the wake of Disney’s firing of Babbitt and other artists who favored the 
new union, the working class of the animation industry coordinated with Sorrell to strike WDP in 
																																								 																				
7 Walt Disney, “Talk Given by Walt to All Employees,” February 10 and 11, 1941, Motion Picture Screen 
Cartoonists Guild, Local 839 Collection, Special Collections and Archives, Oviatt Library, California State 
University, Northridge, truncated herein as “MPSCG.” 
8 Herbert K. Sorrell, You Don’t Choose Your Friends: The Memoirs of Herbert Knott Sorrell, interviewed by 
Elizabeth I. Dixon, 1961, Oral History Program, University of California, Los Angeles, 1963, 15-22. 
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1941. The Animator’s Strike signified more than a rejection of the prevailing anti-unionism at 
Disney’s studio. It was a watershed moment in the era of Hollywood unionization that 
galvanized support for Herb Sorrell among the industry’s left wing. 
WDP executives knew that a work stoppage threatened the company’s bottom line, but 
their efforts to prevent the unionization of Disney’s artists led to attacks from all sides. While the 
labor-management conflict took root in Hollywood, Walt Disney had already cast his gaze on 
Central and South America. Before a resolution with the striking animators had been reached, 
Disney and several of his loyalists coordinated their efforts with Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of 
Inter-American Affairs. Their mission was to foster hemispheric solidarity and out-propagandize 
the Third Reich. In the process of becoming a model Good Neighbor, Disney was able to 
experiment with more didactic forms of animation. For a moment, Donald Duck became one of 
the United States’ most recognizable foreign dignitaries. Other film makers and businessmen 
embarked on similar “south of the border” ventures, but Disney and his studio benefited greatly 
from the economic, social, and political capital gained through lucrative contracts with the 
federal government and private industries.9 This marriage between the state and art helped 
Disney’s studio transition from an innocuous cartoon factory to a fully-fledged American war 
machine.  
As the U.S. entered the Second World War, Disney’s studio continued to produce films 
for the military and other branches of the federal government. No amount of government 
connections, however, granted him total victory over his enemies in Hollywood’s continuing 
labor movement. WDP lost its public battle with Art Babbitt when the NLRB found in favor of 
																																								 																				
9 J.B. Kaufman, South of the Border with Disney: Walt Disney and the Good Neighbor Program, 1941-1948, (New 
York: Disney Editions, 2009). 
5 
the artists for wrongful termination and lost wages following the Animator’s Strike of 1941.10 By 
1945, however, the SCG had drawn itself—quite literally—into a jurisdictional dispute between 
the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU), led by Sorrell, and leadership of the IATSE at the 
Warner Brothers Studio.11 Unlike the previous strike at Disney’s studio, wherein the violence 
was mostly symbolic, the Warner Brothers affair erupted in actual bloodshed. Although 
Hollywood’s working class was only a segment of a larger, nationwide labor movement, the 
federal government’s postwar legislative reaction was clearly aimed at organizations like the 
CSU. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which effectively neutered agitators like 
Sorrell and left-leaning unions such as the CSU. Hollywood’s right-wing, Disney included, had 
crushed their opposition by the latter half of the 1940s. 
By the end of 1947, a moral panic enveloped Hollywood. Radicalism and alleged 
subversive activity came to be viewed as national security threats. The panic was based on an 
alleged Communist plot to gain control of the motion picture industry and its didactic apparatus. 
Some of the seeds of this fear were planted by Disney and other right-wing ideologues such as 
Ayn Rand, an author and Soviet émigré. Disney, Rand, and other elites from the film making 
industry organized the Motion Picture Society for the Preservation of American Ideals (MPA), a 
group that intended to combat the alleged Red Menace operating behind the scenes at the movie 
studios. These events culminated in a series of congressional hearings held by the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC) in October of 1947, which in turn lead to the 
																																								 																				
10 NLRB v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F.2d 44; 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 2231. 
11 Roy Brewer, I.A.T.S.E. Informational Bulletin (International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, 
November 13, 1945), Sorrell, Herbert K. – Investigative File, Exhibits, Evidence, and Other Records of the 
Investigative Section of the Internal Security Committee During the 79th through 94th Congress Related to the 
Hollywood Black List. Committee Papers, 1945-1975, Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-2015, 
Record Group 233, National Archives Building, Washington DC. Subsequent references to these investigative 
documents and witness files were truncated herein as “RG233.” 
6 
“Hollywood inquisition” and the blacklisting of several prominent writers and artists.12 Walt 
Disney’s role in all of these events—from his labor troubles that began in the mid-1930s to his 
testimony before Congress in 1947—was informed by his steadfast commitment to right-wing, 
nationalist ideology.  
Storyboarding the Past 
In 1937, it may have been true that the efforts of artists in tinsel town to organize their 
labor bore little resemblance to those of the autoworkers in Dearborn, Michigan or Chicago’s 
steelworkers. For numerous reasons, Hollywood’s labor movement has been overlooked by 
working-class historians. In part, this inattention to unionization within the motion picture 
industry has been the result of apathy towards film as an ideological medium, particularly among 
U.S. labor’s rank and file. Historian Steven Ross inferred, from an interview in the late-1980s 
with David Beck of the Teamsters, that the leadership of the labor movement “fail[ed] to 
appreciate that cultural struggles were…just as important as workplace struggles.”13 Since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, however, the motion picture industry has had a genuine 
connection to the working-class in America. It was not the magical kiss of the Roosevelt 
Administration’s New Deal—nor its “contradictory programmatic mélange,” as it has been 
described by Joseph McCartin—that aroused Hollywood’s labor movement from its slumber.14 
																																								 																				
12 Larry Ceplair and Steven Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community, 1930-60 
(Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003). 
13 Ross provided Beck’s incredulous response verbatim: “Movies? Who gives a fuck about the movies!” See: Steven 
J. Ross, “American Workers, American Movies: Historiography and Methodology,” International Labor and 
Working-Class History no. 59 (Spring 2001): 81, URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547901004100, accessed: 
January 2020.  
14 Joseph A. McCartin, “‘As Long as There Survives’: Contemplating the Wagner Act after Eighty Years.” Labor: 
Studies in Working-Class History 14, no. 2 (2017): 22-3, Duke University Press, URL: 
https://doi.org/10.1215/15476715-3790138, accessed: January 2020. 
7 
By the time the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Board was affirmed, America’s 
working-class had been wide awake for decades. 
In the 1980s, Roy Rosenzweig argued that “it may be more fruitful to focus on the movie 
going experience, rather than…content.”15 While movie theaters were sites for interclass conflict 
and exchange, consumption was only part of the equation. The motion picture companies in 
Hollywood were built on the same industrial foundations as many other U.S. corporations. Film 
production and distribution played equally significant roles in the industry’s rise to prominence. 
Also, as Lizabeth Cohen has noted, corporate takeovers involving the distribution of films and 
industry advances in technology “disrupted the equilibrium between the neighborhood theatre 
and the chain-owned picture palaces” of the 1930s in Chicago.16 If Rosenzweig or Cohen had 
turned their gaze a bit higher than the working-class moviegoers themselves or the raucous 
theaters they frequented, then they might have caught a glimpse of a hostile takeover in the 
projection booth. As Rosenzweig and Cohen have suggested, working-class Americans still 
crowded the seats of movie theatres during the mid-1930, despite the deleterious effects of the 
Great Depression.17  
The Chicago mob found its way into the motion picture racket by infiltrating the IATSE 
vis-à-vis the screen projectionists during the Great Depression. As Herbert K. Sorrell, founder of 
the CSU and alleged Communist, recalled when providing his oral history to Elizabeth Dixon in 
the 1961, George Browne, representative for Chicago’s film projectionists and later president for 
																																								 																				
15 Roy Rosenzweig, “From Rum Shop to Rialto: Workers and Movies,” in Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers 
and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Modern History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.) 199. 
16 Lizabeth Cohen, “Encountering Mass Culture,” in Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-
1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 125. 
17 As theatres increased their capacity, crowds of working-class moviegoers and their behaviors became more 
heterogeneous, see: Cohen, “Encountering Mass Culture,” 121-31; Rosenzweig, “From Rum Shop to Rialto,” 198-
204. 
8 
the IATSE in the 1930s, and Willie Bioff, his enforcer, were central to the plot.18 During the 
Great Depression, Browne and Bioff ran a racket where they would recruit projectionists, 
arrange to collect wages for two men, staff the theatre booths with a single man, and then pocket 
the difference. Through this scheme, Browne and Bioff gained admission to the IATSE’s 
executive leadership, with a little help from the Chicago mob, but the production process was 
where the magic of motion pictures really shined. Walt Disney despised unions, but WDP—like 
most other major studios—made exceptions for the IATSE. The IATSE’s muscle and backroom 
connections in Hollywood made tolerating the organization’s presence a necessary evil for many 
major motion picture studios.  
At this point, it may also be appropriate to address the other flying elephant in the room: 
“Ideological Imagineering.” As with in-betweening, this is another bastardization of Disney’s 
corporate jargon with a complex meaning. The term, Imagineering, has traditionally been used to 
describe the creative engineering process for developing guest experiences at the Disney theme 
parks. Ideological Imagineering, on the other hand, has been applied to the WDC’s relationship 
with U.S. history. In the mid-1980s, Mike Wallace addressed the concept of Imagineering in an 
essay on the national mythmaking performed at California’s Disneyland and Walt Disney World 
in Orlando, Florida, or what he called “Mickey Mouse History.”19 There was a great deal of 
disservice being done to public history, he argued. Imagineering has been a key element of 
Disney’s very public and profitable mythmaking since the company’s beginnings as a young 
																																								 																				
18 Sorrell became a prime example of labor historians’ inattention to Hollywood’s unionization. For what little 
analysis there has been on the labor agitator’s significance, see: Laurie Pintar, “Herbert K. Sorrell as the Grade-B 
Hero: Militancy and Masculinity in the Studios.” Labor History 37, no. 3 (1996): 392-416, Taylor & Francis, URL: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00236619612331386883, accessed: January 2020.   
19 Mike Wallace, “Mickey Mouse History: Portraying the Past at Disney World,” Radical History no. 32 (January 
1985): 33-57, Duke University Press, URL: https://doi.org/10.1215/01636545-1985-32-33, accessed: January 2020. 
9 
animation startup in the 1920s. According to Wallace, “At Disneyland in California and Disney 
World in Florida, the past is powerfully evoked for visitors—using music, movies, robots, and 
the latest in special effects.”20 Logically, Imagineers were part of that process. As an 
“Imagineer” explained to Wallace in the 1980s, their job was to “create…a ‘Disney Realism’, 
sort of Utopian in nature, where we can carefully program out all the negative, unwanted 
elements.”21 This Disney Realism has been practiced in the physical realm—in its theme parks—
and in the ideological realm—in its mass media products and their merchandising. Both were the 
product of the WDP’s long and sordid history involving the Hollywood labor movement and 
Ideological Imagineering. 
At the end of Ross’ “American Workers, American Movies,” the historian called on 
future scholars to “convey a new appreciation of film as integral to organizing the American 
workplace and the American mind.”22 Though Wallace’s analysis of Disney’s theme parks and 
their presentation of public history preceded Ross’ call to action by nearly two decades, it also 
suggested that Disney’s history laid at that crossroads. The research presented here places 
WDC’s corporate history at that intersection of the “American workplace and the American 
mind.”23 More importantly, it endeavors to simultaneously answer Ross’ prompt while 
expanding upon Wallace’s scathing critique. This thesis is a deconstruction of the legacies of 




20 Wallace, “Mickey Mouse History,” 35. 
21 Wallace, “Mickey Mouse History,” 35. 
22 Ross, “American Workers, American Movies,” 99. Emphasis added. 
23 Ross, “American Workers, American Movies,” 99.  
10 
The Breakdown 
In the early-1940s, social and political scientists took notice of labor organization in the 
motion picture industry. In 1941, Murray Ross, for example, declared that “Hollywood is a union 
town” in his opening statement of Stars and Strikes.24 A closer examination of the politics 
involved in Hollywood’s labor-management relations, however, would have betrayed Ross’ 
enthusiasm for the progress he documented. Although the passage of the Wagner Act set the 
stage, so to speak, for substantial momentum among the film industry’s workers, recognition of 
their federally-guaranteed rights to organize did not magically appear once the legislation passed 
constitutional muster in the courts.25 Those rights had to be asserted, and as it was in other 
industrial sectors, that process was often ugly. According to a later assessment by Ross, “the 
Hollywood craft unions returned to their traditional jurisdictional quarrels…after the end of 
World War II.”26 As suggested by one of Ross’ fellow social scientists, the expanding popularity 
of the motion picture industry exacerbated economic disparities in Hollywood. In 1948, A.P. 
Dawson agreed with Ross that “motion picture employees [were] among the highest paid 
workers in the world,” but major labor organizations like the Conference of Studio Unions 
(CSU) and the IATSE had been plagued by “internecine squabbles.”27 By the end of the decade, 
it was difficult to ascertain whether academics like Dawson and Ross agreed that efforts to 
unionize the labor of the motion picture industry had paid off for the working class. 
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One strategy that actually paid dividends for Hollywood’s labor movement from 1935 to 
1947 was falling in line with Herb Sorrell and the Conference of Studio Unions. This tactic 
required both stamina and courage, however. Throughout the latter half of the 1930s and into the 
mid-1940s, the smaller CSU remained in constant conflict with the much larger IATSE. 
Hollywood’s left-wing laborites resisted the corruption of mob influence from the beginning. 
Furthermore, some of the avenues for suppressing labor’s resistance included accusations of 
subversive or radical activity and Communist tendencies or affiliations.28 Such charges had 
razor-sharp teeth and could bring the weight of the federal government down to crush left-wing 
opposition. As Sorrell explained, “it’s unbelievable how far people will go to win a point. When 
they find someone that won’t sell out…they try to kill him or, at least, call him a Communist.”29 
Democratic unionization may not have won the war for control of Hollywood’s labor movement, 
but thanks to men like Sorrell and the CSU, they managed to put up one hell of a fight for the 
better part of the decade. 
One particularly interesting segment of Hollywood’s workforce included its animators 
and cartoonists. In Drawing the Line, animator and historian, Tom Sito updated Ross’ 1941 
declaration with an addendum: “Hollywood is a union town…Mickey Mouse…Donald Duck, 
Goofy…Ariel…Roger Rabbit [etc.] were all created by union men and women."30 As media 
intended for child-consumers, these cartoon characters have been sold to the public as innocuous 
entertainment. However, nothing could have been further from the truth with regard to the 
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ideology involved in their creation. Sito further argued that “no one can hope to really 
understand the history of the American animated cartoon without knowing the unions’ story.”31 
The first rumblings of American animators’ unionization came from the home of Popeye and 
Betty Boop in 1937. As noted by Sito, artists employed by Max Fleischer’s animation studio in 
New York City were among the first to invoke their newly-acquired constitutional rights under 
the Wagner Act.32 In Hollywood, several animation departments faced little resistance to their 
lobbying for higher wages and better working conditions. Most of the major studios quickly 
folded to the demands of their artists once Sorrell began negotiating on their behalf. Although, as 
evinced by the events surrounding the Animator’s Strike of 1941, pinning a union button on 
Mickey Mouse and/or Donald Duck would prove to be an arduous task. 
Though Sito alluded to Disney’s hasty departure from the country during the Animator’s 
strike, Darlene Sadlier offered a view from the top regarding the significance of Disney’s efforts 
in shaping the face of Good Neighbor diplomacy. In Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural 
Diplomacy in World War II, Sadlier provided a thorough examination of the OIAA’s multi-
faceted approach to “smart power,” including the agency’s Motion Picture Division, headed by 
John Hay Whitney.33 The work of Greg Grandin, however, offered a more interesting 
historiographic opening in which Disney’s Central and South American exploits could be 
examined. According to Grandin, in Empire’s Workshop, the western hemisphere was where the 
U.S. empire gradually transitioned to a militaristic form of intervention, justifying “belligerent 
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teamed up with Stan Lee and Joe Simon in 1941, and together, they founded the cultural juggernaut, Marvel 
Comics, see: Sito, Drawing the Line, 98. 
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diplomacy, not just for the sake of nation building but to advance ‘freedom’.”34 By the early-
1940s, Disney and his artists had expanded their focus beyond cultural production. By currying 
favor from defense industries, WDP had ingratiated itself to the U.S. military-industrial complex. 
Additionally, Disney had co-conspirators and competition in Central and South America. 
American entrepreneur, Henry Ford, and fellow Hollywood filmmaker, Orson Welles, made 
useful—albeit tangential—examples for comparison. Conservatively stated, Ford and Welles 
experienced modest failures in their Central and South American missions, whereas Disney 
became a paragon of the Good Neighbor program with industry support and the assistance of 
Rockefeller’s OIAA.35 
Returning to the domestic concern of Hollywood’s ongoing labor movement, Gerald 
Horne offered a more nuanced, macro-level perspective in Class Struggle in Hollywood, 1930-
1950.36 Horne’s work was complimentary to the research performed by Sito—an industry 
insider. Examining several internal conflicts among the labor movement, Horne argued that 
while “a more complete understanding of movies may be within the ‘intellectual’s grasp’, it 
cannot be reached…absent an understanding of the basic relations of production” in the motion 
picture industry.37 In addition to inter-class conflict, Horne also noted that there were 
problematic views held by actors and activists on either side of Hollywood’s ideological 
spectrum. The CSU faced internal struggles as it battled with IATSE dominance. According to 
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Horne, Jeff Kibre, another prominent California labor leader, would have agreed that the IATSE 
served as an industry-wide “company union and scab-herding agency” for Hollywood 
filmmakers by the mid-1940s.38 Labor and ideology appeared to be inseparable, so this led to the 
realization that a case study of Disney’s labor-management conflict, when combined with his 
ideological zeal, had significant implications regarding the lifeblood of his Burbank studio in the 
1940s.  
Lastly, Thomas Doherty’s Show Trial moved beyond the immense complexity of the 
“Hollywood inquisition,” as studied by Larry Ceplair and Steven Englund, to argue that the 
HUAC hearings regarding the motion picture industry in 1947 were simply part of an elaborate 
production.39  The need for the inquiry was largely substantiated by information contained in the 
investigative reports of H.A. Smith, a former agent at J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. As Doherty noted, the 1947 hearings were a reprisal of the relatively mundane 
inquiries made by the HUAC in 1938, helmed by Martin Dies.40 This earlier iteration of the 
HUAC and Dies’ red-baiting failed to maintain the attention of the American public, who were 
easily distracted by the nation’s preparation during the War. Postwar prosperity, however, had 
delivered American consumers more than enough daily bread.41 The government needed a new 
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type of circus. According to Lowell Mellett, former head of the Bureau of Motion Pictures for 
the U.S. Office of War Intelligence (OWI), that “three-ring circus” was to be presented in 
October of 1947.42 Together, these factors ensured that the public remained somewhat 
preoccupied as the U.S. entered into its Cold War with the Soviets, and Walt Disney became a 
prized witness when called to testify before the HUAC.  
This thesis expounds on the meticulous research and historical labor of those discussed 
above, while filling in perceived gaps in the literature. Chapter I, “Of Mice and Layout Men,” 
furthers Sito’s argument that Disney animators such as Dave Hilberman, Art Babbitt, and Bill 
Hurtz—among numerous others—should be “renowned for their artistic achievements…and 
lives as labor activists.”43 Chapter II, “Donald Diplomacy,” accentuates the transitional period 
between the U.S. empire’s use of “soft power” and militaristic influence over its hemispheric 
neighbors, as posited by Sadlier and Grandin.44 Unlike Horne’s broader analysis, which was 
insightful in its own right, Chapter III, “The American Art of War,” shifts attention to the 
artwork created by participants in the Hollywood labor movement and discusses their 
interpretations of the CSU’s clashes with IATSE forces and industry executives. The fourth and 
final chapter of this thesis, “Artists Shrugged,” concerns Doherty’s observation that “when the 
capitals of entertainment and politics converge the result is mutually corrosive,” but narrows its 
focus in order to evince a rather simple proposal.45 During the mid-twentieth century, Disney and 
his studio, the Hollywood labor movement, and the government of the United States were caught 
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in between two sides of an ideological conflict which was exacerbated, violently in some cases 
by nationalist Imagineers. 
The In-Between 
Serious analysis of Disney’s past has presented several challenges for scholars of history, 
not the least of which has been the WDC’s legion of copyright and intellectual property 
attorneys. Another one of these challenges pertained to accessing primary sources. Few 
legitimate historians have infiltrated the WDC’s corporate archives, whose entrance is guarded 
by massive, imposing sculptures of Snow White’s notorious dwarves. On the other hand, a 
wealth of material patiently awaits resourceful and diligent researchers beyond the confines of 
WDC’s Burbank studio. Precisely because of Disney’s longstanding relationship with the federal 
government, several Record Groups in the National Archives II facility in College Park, 
Maryland housed primary evidence related to his studio’s contract work for the OIAA, Office of 
War Intelligence, and defense industries.46 Additional records, pertaining to various related 
HUAC investigations were also found in the Legislative Archives maintained in Washington 
D.C.47 These official records of government agencies and congressional inquiry, however, lacked 
context only available in the capital of the U.S. filmmaking industry. 
 Incorporating a grassroots perspective into the events examined in this thesis required 
some historical in-between work be performed in the archives of Southern California. A 
substantial collection of Herb Sorrell’s personal documents related to the Hollywood labor 
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movement can be found in the Charles E. Young Research Library at University of California, 
Los Angeles. In addition to the scrapbooks kept by Sorrell during the strikes of the mid-1940s, 
UCLA has possession of one of the only printed transcripts of Sorrell’s oral history.48 
Furthermore, many of the strike-related records of the SCG are housed at the Oviatt Library’s 
Special Collections at California State University, Northridge. In addition to the sources on the 
Disney Strike, CSUN’s archive also had a noteworthy research file maintained by the Jewish 
Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles on the MPA.49  
Finally, one of the more remarkable resources consulted lied off the beaten path at the 
Southern California Library for Social Science and Research. The history of the library’s archive 
was a fascinating one in and of itself. Emil Freed, the library’s founder was a member of 
California’s Communist Party, was actively engaged in labor organization prior to the merger 
between the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO), and was instrumental in founding several of the state’s labor schools derided by right-
wing, nationalist ideologues.50 Among the useful items held at the archive founded by Freed 
were the personal papers of David Hilberman, one of Disney’s artists and fellow founder of the 
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studio’s SCG unit.51 In summation, exploring all of these archives, including a few others in New 
York City, provided an immersive historical experience unmatched by any Disney-branded 
theme park. This was a working-class, “Mickey Mouse History,” to borrow the phrase from 
Wallace’s lexicon, for Hollywood’s labor movement.52 
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CHAPTER II 




This chapter centers on Walt Disney’s industrialization of the animation process, and the 
labor-management conflict at his Burbank studio which resulted in the Animator’s Strike of 
1941. Principally, this section argues that while Disney made substantial efforts to increase the 
production output of his studio, he did so by attempting to circumvent mandates under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and intimidate his workforce into submission. More 
importantly, Disney’s struggle to limit the influence of external actors on his studio’s operation 
failed. 
 After the passage of the NLRA, Walt Disney’s cartoon factory—inspired by other 
prominent American industrialists like Henry Ford—engaged in the standardization of its 
process of hand-drawn animation in the 1930s. At the same time, Disney and other executives of 
Walt Disney Productions, Ltd. (WDP) devised a strategy to prevent outside labor organizations 
from infiltrating the studio: the formation of a company union. In 1939, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) determined that the Federation of Screen Cartoonists (FSC), a company 
union, would become the exclusive bargaining agent for employees in Disney’s animation 
department. Some artists, however, took umbrage with the FSC for its lack of legitimacy. 
Emboldened by key provisions of the Wagner Act, a group of animators turned to Herb Sorrell, a 
Hollywood labor leader who facilitated an alliance with animation departments from the other 
major studios. The result was an independent union known as the Motion Picture Screen 
Cartoonists Guild (SCG). Disney rebuked the demands of the SCG’s negotiating committee in 
private, he chided its participating employees in public meetings, and he attempted to rid his 
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studio of labor activists by terminating their contracts. The latter of these decisions, however, 
became the straw that broke the proverbial mouse’s back. On the national level, the protests of 
these artists may have differed from the autoworkers engaging in sit-downs, and their collective 
fate was hardly as macabre as some of Chicago’s steel workers. Notwithstanding those 
differences, the talented men and women who struck Disney’s studio in 1941 represented some 
of the most creative minds in the motion picture industry. They felt sure that no one would 
ignore a picket line, starring Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck. 
Acting in Bad Faith 
By the mid-1930s, state actors were no strangers to violent clashes that troubled labor-
management relations in the U.S. Not unlike the roles fulfilled by Pinkerton detectives in the 
nineteenth century, local law enforcement had been conscripted by Henry Ford to combat the 
United Auto Workers’ attempts to better their station by engaging in sit-down protests.53 
Additionally, as James Gross noted, Chicago experienced its own flare-up of police brutality in 
response to organizers in the steel manufacturing sector.54 The latter resulted in the outright 
murder of labor activists by Chicago police. All of this was to say that federal intervention 
between labor and management may have not been inevitable, but it definitely commanded 
attention. That negative attention resulted in the formulation of a New Deal for America’s 
working class: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which was passed by the federal 
legislature in 1935. The federally-protected right for laborers to pool their efforts, however, was 
anything but assured. As Joseph McCartin has argued, “even fervent supporters of labor reform 
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doubted whether Senator Robert F. Wagner’s [NLRA]…could withstand the scrutiny of a hostile 
U.S. Supreme Court.”55 When the Wagner Act was declared constitutional in 1937, it seemed 
like a dream come true for workers across many U.S. industries.  
Turning dreams into reality was a booming business, but contrary to corporate folklore, 
the tale of Walt Disney, “the avuncular Horatio Alger figure,” did not start with a mouse.56 In the 
mid-1920s, Walt Disney, his brother Roy, and Ub Iwerks made the fortuitous decision to invest 
in a joint venture and form a Hollywood animation studio. The trio’s studio, which came to be 
known as Walt Disney Productions, Ltd. (WDP), was able to push technological boundaries and 
set artistic precedents by drawing inspiration from other industrial imaginaries. According to 
Steven Watts, Disney and Henry Ford shared the same vision of “humane, populist capitalism 
that would bring a quality product to the masses.”57 At its core, WDP was more than an 
animation studio, however. Disney’s cartoon factory had quickly grown beyond the handful of 
aspiring artists it started out with, and WDP soon employed an industrial workforce of several 
hundred. 
By 1934, Disney and the artists he employed had begun their most ground-breaking 
experiment to date: a feature-length, animated adaptation of a classic tale from the Brothers 
Grimm. As a feature-length, animated project, Snow White was an unprecedented undertaking, 
particularly for an experimental Hollywood startup. Disney had a penchant for audacity, even his 
critics granted him that. In the 1940s, art critic Robert Feild was granted an opportunity to 
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explore Disney’s fantasy factory in person. His findings were published in a 1942 monograph 
titled: The Art of Walt Disney.58  
Paradoxically, as Feild noted, Disney’s employees were some of the industry’s most 
prominent producers of hand-drawn animation, but Walt Disney himself had “never been 
interested in ‘Art’.”59 Instead, Disney believed that his studio could be used as a sort of cultural 
laboratory. In the words of Feild, WDP became “an industrial plant that allowed [Disney’s] ideas 
to be developed as scientifically as possible.”60 Disney’s scientific method depended on a 
collaborative effort. Earlier Disney apologists, such as Field, observed that “with the advent of 
Snow White…the old system [involving fewer artists] was no longer practical.”61  
In 1937, one writer for the Motion Picture Herald attempted to calculate the amount of 
labor required for projects like Snow White. The columnist reported, “had Walt Disney decided 
to draw…his first feature length production and in color, all by himself, he would have had a 
230-year job on his hands.”62 Disney may have been a creative genius, but he was not a literal 
magician. It required hundreds of artists and technicians to bring Disney’s vision into reality. The 
lowliest of these animators, the in-betweeners mentioned previously, “numerically form[ed] the 
main army of animation” at WDP.63 Nevertheless, it was Disney’s name, alone, at the top of the 
marquee when Snow White was released in theatres. It was Disney, alone, who received his 
honorary category and statuette—and seven miniature statuettes, delivered by Shirley Temple at 
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the 11th Annual Academy Awards.64 It was Disney, alone, who stood on the shoulders of artistic 
titans, but it was he alone that failed to reward their contributions to his success—aside from 
granting them an opportunity of saying they worked for Disney.  
Had Disney conjured up the storyboards for Snow White a few years earlier, his 
exploitative business practices may have gone unnoticed. Although, as James Gross argued in his 
account of the NLRB’s internal politics, the Board had some experience adjudicating disputes 
between employers and labor, “the massive onslaught of cases after April 12, 1937 brought the 
Board into full scale contact with the violence and melodrama of American industrial 
relations.”65 The extraordinary achievements of Snow White came about during an interesting 
time. However, the enormous amount of labor the film required meant inviting the presence of 
labor organizers, unions, and federal arbitrators into Disney’s production process.  
Snow White and the Wagner Act had more in common than one might have thought. 
Animation required for this feature-length production took place as the Wagner Act was signed 
into law. Furthermore, Disney’s grand experiment premiered in theaters the same year that the 
constitutionality of the Act was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.66 Most of all, the tale of the 
original Disney Princess and the efficacy of WDP’s first official union were both imaginary 
constructs. Understanding, though not agreeing with, the implications of the Wagner Act, Disney 
facilitated the organization of the FSC through his corporate counsel, Gunther Lessing. The FSC 
served the interests of Disney’s studio but not the artists who built it. The company union was 
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mostly a tactic for placating the studio’s artists as they acquired the legal right to collective 
bargaining. One of the FSC’s primary functions was to insulate Disney’s animation department 
from outside influence and stave off any internal attempts to unionize.  
In 1938, the FSC filed a complaint with the NLRB regarding a jurisdictional dispute 
between the company union, the Society of Motion Picture Film Editors, the American 
Federation of Musicians, and several local organizations affiliated with the International Alliance 
of Theatrical and Stage Employees (IATSE). 67 Based on evidence provided by the FSC, it 
allegedly represented a majority of Disney’s workforce. At the time the complaint was filed, the 
FSC’s membership was comprised of “approximately 602 [of the 675 employees]” who were 
classified as “animators, animation effects, In-B-Tween [sic]… production stenographic (front 
office), painting and miscellaneous.”68 The Federation prevailed during WDP’s initial encounter 
with the NLRB, and the company union became certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for 
Disney’s animators.  
If there was a silver-lining in the NLRB’s 1939 decision, it was the determination that 
“neither the IATSE nor its Locals…submitted any evidence with respect to any membership 
among the employees of the Company.”69 Unfortunately for Disney’s employees, the IATSE 
executives were still allowed to represent some of the WDP’s workforce. A racket involving the 
IATSE and motion picture industry began in Chicago during the Great Depression and lasted 
from the early-1930s to the mid-1940s. According to Gerald Horne, Willie Bioff, a Russian-born 
immigrant who had his first encounter with labor while “organizing local Kosher butchers,” was 
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one of the two men primarily responsible for this operation in Chicago.70 Bioff may have been 
the muscle, but George Browne, the future President of the IATSE, was the likely architect of 
their plan. Although the lineup presented below was distributed by the Film Technicians of the 
Motion Picture Industry in a union periodical after events in the mid-1940s, it served to put a 




Figure 2.1, “Graft, Inc.,” Flashes, ca. 1945-47, image used courtesy of the Southern 
California Library for Social Studies Research. 
 
According to Sorrell, Bioff and Browne browbeat the Chicago projectionists into 
participating in an extortion scheme involving movie theatres.72 As the press would later 
confirm, Bioff and Browne received kickbacks from understaffing the projection booths in 
movie houses for the IATSE. Nicholas Schenck, also pictured in Figure 2.1, was a wealthy 
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movie theatre magnate. Because he was head of Loews Movie Theatres, Schenck also had 
several contacts at major Hollywood motion picture studios including personal connections to 
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer and Twentieth Century Fox. 
As Sorrell indicated during his oral history interview, the two extortionists “celebrated 
too much,” and Al Capone’s organized crime syndicate caught the two men with their hands in 
the popcorn bucket.73 Frank Nitti, one of Capone’s enforcers, wanted in on their action. In 1934, 
Bioff and Browne were brought in for a shakedown by Nitti. According to Horne, they were 
installed as puppets in the IATSE’s national leadership. In exchange for their fealty, Bioff and 
Browne received mob assistance with persuading non-union movie houses to enter into contracts 
with the IATSE.74 Browne held an official position in the IATSE as its president from 1934 until 
he was indicted and convicted on federal extortion charges in 1941. While Bioff’s labor in 
Hollywood was mostly off the books, he was a local celebrity. The local trade press and 
paparazzi kept tabs on his comings and goings. By the mid-1930s, Bioff and Browne, along with 
Shenck and other co-conspirators, were reportedly exchanging five and six-figure sums of cash 
in elaborate backstage handoffs. Hollywood’s smaller unions, however, were not lying down on 
the job of pushing back on the corruption.  
 Before delving too much further into labor-management relations at WDP, it is important 
to identify and examine another one of Disney’s henchmen: his lawyer. In addition to loaning the 
Brothers Disney and Iwerks some of their initial investment capital, Gunther Lessing served as 
legal counsel and Vice President of WDP. One of Lessing’s claims to fame was his 
representation of Pancho Villa while the Mexican revolutionary was trying to option the rights to 
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his biography.75 Disney often fed off of Lessing’s anti-unionism in their decision-making during 
the labor-management disputes at WDP. Tom Sito argued that Lessing “had a Texas 
frontiersman’s innate distrust of unions.”76 To that end, at Disney’s behest, Lessing was often 
present when the FSC held its meetings. According to an affidavit filed with the NLRB in 1941 
by Dave Hilberman, layout man for Disney and Secretary for the studio’s SCG Unit, Lessing 
meddled in FSC business from the moment of its formation.77 Hilberman explained that Lessing 
made his opinions of labor-management known to Disney’s artists. Hilberman added that 
Lessing used these meetings as opportunities to insult Carey McWilliams, who was representing 
Hollywood’s other cartoonists as they formed the SCG. Hilberman suggested that Lessing 
referred to McWilliams “disparagingly…as an attorney for the CIO.”78 This made little sense, 
however, as the SCG claimed an affiliation with the AFL.  
As Horne also noted, there was “a surge in Hollywood union membership between 1936-
1938.”79 Herb Sorrell and his fellow painter brethren benefited from the increased interest in 
unionizing among trade and craftsmen and women working in the motion picture industry. 
Sorrell seemed to have friends in all the right places. Bioff may have been mob-affiliated, but 
Sorrell was able to leverage his labor contacts to prove that the panderer was not untouchable. 
There had been numerous allegations that Sorrell had ties to the Communist Party, he had been 
under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since the 1930s. Nevertheless, Sorrell 
sought the aid of federal investigators in exposing Browne and Bioff’s IATSE racket. According 
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to Sorrell, the FBI refused to offer any assistance, as did the Internal Revenue Service.80 
Hollywood’s journalists, however, had been organizing a union of their own and favored leaders 
like Sorrell. The labor organizer was able to tap their resources to make the IATSE scheme 
public. It was discovered, and subsequently reported in the newspapers, that Bioff had never 
served a six-month sentence to be served in Chicago’s Bridewell Prison.81 
The appearance of Sorrell, a stocky union activist who looked like he could handle 
himself in a scrap, may not have been too different from the IATSE’s enforcers, but he was 
instrumental in forming the resistance to their corrupt influence.82 Sorrell had discovered the 
means by which to eliminate at least one of the IATSE’s enforcers, albeit temporarily, but the 
way he achieved this goal was even more fascinating. In the mid-1930s, John L. Lewis was 
breaking away from existing AFL leadership, literally punching a rival labor organizer in the 
face.83 By 1938, Lewis’ vision for a more radical national labor movement had metastasized into 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). According to Robert Ziegler, the gains made for 
auto and steel workers, by Lewis and the CIO, “unleashed a wave…that swelled union ranks and 
gave powerful legitimacy to the… project.”84 Sorrell experienced a similar boost in popularity 
after organizing the Hollywood cartoonists. He later capitalized on the momentum created by the 
Animator’s Strike at Disney’s studio to form the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU). Although 
Sorrell’s primary union—the International Brotherhood of Painters—was an AFL affiliate, he 
continued to work with Lewis in California. Sorrell recalled that “Lewis became national 
																																								 																				
80 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 90-92. 
81 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 90-92. 
82 Bill Littlejohn, “Drawing of Herb Sorrell,” ca. 1941, MPSCG; “Herb Sorrell,” photograph, ca. 1941, MPSCG. 
Both images used courtesy of California State University Northridge. 
83 Robert Ziegler, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 22-3. 
84 Robert Ziegler, The CIO, 54. 
29 
president of… [the Laborers’ Non-Partisan League, and] I became president of the” League’s 
California chapter.85 Sorrell’s connection to Lewis created a pathway to finalizing Bioff’s 
extradition to Chicago. Through the League, Sorrell was able “to get a delegation to visit 
[California’s] Governor Olson when he signed the extradition” order to send Bioff back to 
Bridewell.86  
Other national labor leaders had taken notice of Sorrell’s solicitation of aid from Lewis 
and the CIO. Sorrell’s cozy relationship with Lewis, for example, raised a major red flag for the 
AFL. When Sorrell began working with the SCG organizers, Aubrey Blair, a representative of 
the AFL offered to fund the printing of the Guild’s material.87 Blair’s support of the cartoonists 
also led to the surveillance of Sorrell and his alleged ties within the Communist community. 
Sorrell later discovered that Joseph Tuohy and David Beck of the Teamsters had directed Blair to 
observe his activities.88 It was more difficult to ascertain which motion picture studios and labor 
organizations were not surveilling Sorrell. 
Though Walt Disney and Herb Sorrell seemed destined to become mortal enemies, their 
biographies bore some resemblance. Both men migrated to Hollywood from the American Mid-
West. Disney always regarded Marceline, Missouri as the town of his youth, even though he was 
born in Chicago, Illinois.89 Despite growing up and watching his father struggle trying to make a 
living as a Jeffersonian agrarian or suffering through factory work for a jelly company, Disney 
thought that the Horatio Alger myth was more than an American fairy tale. Sorrell, on the other 
hand, was actually born in Missouri. He had his first encounter with labor-management conflict 
																																								 																				
85 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 96. 
86 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 90-92. 
87 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 72. 
88 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 72. 
89 For a compassionate interpretation of Walt Disney’s upbringing, see: Watts, The Magic Kingdom, 4-11. 
30 
after his family moved to a “sun-down town” in Alabama when he was only a child in 1904.90 
Nevertheless, Sorrell became a pro-labor firebrand with a heart of gold, or so he claimed. While 
working on his memoir in the early-1960s, Sorrell laid out his passions for the rights of working 
men and women. As he explained to Dixon, “I advocated then, and would still advocate, the 
rights of all people regardless of religion or race or color or creed.”91 Unlike Disney, Sorrell 
believed the right for the working-class to pool their efforts was not only federally recognized, it 
was bestowed by a higher power. Sorrell argued that he “became a rabid union member, which I 
thought was my God-given right.”92 False idols, however, were not allowed on the floor of 
Disney’s cartoon factory. 
Abusing Animators’ Trust 
In a sworn affidavit provided to the NLRB during Disney’s dispute with the SCG in 
1941, Art Babbitt revealed that Lessing and H.E. Keener, corporate counsel and paymaster 
respectively, were pulling the strings behind the curtains of the FSC. Babbitt was a slender, clean 
cut fellow, but he was no corporate puppet.  Babbitt was also one of WDP’s most talented 
animators, and he was well-liked among the other artists at the studio. Not only was he the 
creator of Goofy’s personality, he assisted in breathing animated life into other signature Disney 
characters like Donald Duck.93 
Though Art Babbitt and Walt Disney became bitter rivals as the 1940s began, their 
relationship was interesting from the beginning. Babbitt was interviewed by Animation historian 
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John Canemaker in 1975.94 Babbitt believed Walt Disney had only hired him as a means of 
gaining access to Bill Tytla. During the interview with Canemaker, Babbitt revealed how he and 
Tytla moved from New York City to work for Disney. During his initial interview, “Disney 
wasn’t at all interested in me,” the animator explained, “[he] asked me ‘Now how soon can we 
get this guy Tytla out here?’”95 Babbitt and Tytla had become close friends while working 
together at Terrytoon Studios in New York. The two shared a residence in California, once 
Babbitt had convinced Tytla to move out west to work for Disney.96 Babbitt also recognized that 
Tytla was an extremely talented artist, and someone whom Disney could not do without. He 
explained to Canemaker that a scene in Snow White, drawn by Tytla and featuring all seven 
dwarves, “was a tour de force which nobody has matched at all.”97 Tytla also became famous for 
his contribution to Pinocchio (1940) and the Night on Bald Mountain adaptation in Fantasia 
(1940). Tytla was considered apolitical by his peers, so it was a shock to his fellow animators 
like Babbitt and even Disney when the artist joined the strike. According to Babbitt, Tytla made 
“tremendous financial sacrifices” by selling property “worth a ridiculous figure…to pay for 
Adrienne’s [Tytla’s wife] illness [and] to help the other strikers” in 1941.98 While working for 
Disney, artists became a band of brothers and sisters, bound by ink-and-paint. 
In his NLRB affidavit, Babbitt attested that Dave Hilberman had expressed some concern 
about IATSE encroachment in December 1937.99 By that time, Bioff and Browne were coercing 
motion picture tradesmen into signing with the IATSE with the assistance of the Chicago mob, 
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so the threat was legitimate. According to Babbitt, Hilberman suggested that “something should 
be done about the situation.”100 After Hilberman brought the IATSE matter to Roy Disney’s 
attention, Gunther Lessing held a series of meetings with the studio’s artists to formulate a 
strategy that seemed mutually beneficial. Lessing assured Babbitt and the others that he was not 
calling the meetings “as an officer of the company but as a friend of the boys.”101 As noted by 
Babbitt and Hilberman’s NLRB affidavits, Lessing explained his presence at the FSC meetings 
by insisting that Disney was just as concerned as the artists were about the IATSE pressure on 
WDP’s employees. Stopping short of encouraging Babbitt, Hilberman, and others to form an 
independent union, Lessing advised that they “form a loosely knit organization along social 
lines.”102 Not only was the FSC an ineffective company union, Disney’s artists showed little 
interest in the meetings it held to keep up appearances. According to Babbitt, of the four 
meetings held by the FSC, only between “20 and 40 employees” attended.103  
Babbitt valued his own reputation among the other animators, but that came secondary to 
the well-being of his subordinates. In private, Babbitt had personally gone to Disney to ask for a 
paltry raise for his assistant, Bill Hurtz. As noted by Sito, Walt responded to Babbitt’s request by 
telling him to “mind [his] own goddamn business.”104 Babbitt and a majority of the other artists 
at Disney’s studio agreed amongst themselves to organize independently, as the animation units 
of other studios had done, under the SCG’s banner. When Disney learned of their unionization 
efforts, he called Babbitt in for a private non-negotiation conference. SCG attorney, George 
Bodle, had made several attempts to have Disney sign a contract with the Guild. For example, 
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Bodle wrote to WDP executives in early-December 1940, that “the majority of your employees 
engaged in the production of animated cartoons” had selected the SCG “as their sole-
representative for collective bargaining.”105 Moreover, they were prepared to submit proof of this 
claim to the NLRB. Those requests were mostly ignored on Lessing’s advice. Disney insisted 
that the only way forward required their signing with the company union. Babbitt explained to 
Disney that he “would be ashamed to face” his fellow artists after the FSC’s efforts were shown 
to be in bad faith.106 According to Babbitt—the artists’ de facto leader—Disney scoffed at his 
concern. “Where would I be,” Disney asked rhetorically, “if I couldn’t stand a little ridicule?”107  
According to Babbitt, there was no negotiating with Walt Disney. As the animator 
explained to the NLRB, Disney had once admonished him by declaring: “All the people who 
belong to unions are either crooks or people who want something for nothing. All people in this 
studio who are interested in the unions are the subversive type.”108 Nevertheless, after launching 
into a tirade about how he preferred Henry Ford’s attitude toward labor-management relations, 
Disney got the last word in. Walt Disney was acting more like a petulant “man-child” than a titan 
of industry.109 “You know how I am,” Disney explained, “If anyone tells me what to do, I’ll do 
just the opposite. I would rather close down the studio than have anyone tell me what to do.”110 
In just a few months, Babbitt and the other artists who defected to the SCG would call Disney’s 
bluff, but not before contacting their friendly, neighborhood labor agitator: Herb Sorrell.  
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Seizing the Pixie Dust 
The complaints from Disney’s animation department were not unreasonable, nor were 
their attempts to assert their federally-recognized right to form an independent union. Disney’s 
underpaid and overworked artists had simply had enough. As noted by Sito, Snow White 
demanded “everyone, put in twelve-hour days and seven-day weeks without overtime pay. When 
the budget ran out, many worked without any salary at all…Walt promised his exhausted staff 
that their sacrifices would be repaid with big bonuses from the profits.”111 While Snow White 
broke box office records and captivated audiences, Pinocchio (1940) and the more experimental 
Fantasia (1940) were financial disasters for WDP. These features, especially the latter 
experiment, imposed even more labor-intensive requirements on Disney’s already-disgruntled 
workforce. According to Sito, “Lessing encouraged Disney to head it off by reducing the official 
workweek from forty-six to forty hours a week.”112 Roy Disney addressed this issue in a 
memorandum distributed to studio employees on October 24, 1940. “Naturally,” Roy Disney 
explained, “the reduction in working hours will add a further burden of overtime payments to the 
losses already suffered through the curtailment of foreign revenues.”113 The SCG ramped up its 
membership drives in January 1941. 
Most of the artists who worked on Snow White never received recompense for the film’s 
enormous success. Instead, Disney channeled the animators’ share of Snow White’s profits into 
“his aggressive expansion plans, like the $4.5 million air-conditioned studio being built in 
Burbank.”114 At times, Disney could be downright heartless about swindling his artists into 
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realizing his overly-ambitious visions. According to Sito, Disney once scolded Babbitt saying: 
“You and your Commie friends live in a world so small you don’t really understand what is 
going on around you.”115 By the early-1940s, other animation studios, like Max Fleischer’s for 
example, tempted artists to abandon ship by doubling or tripling the weekly salaries offered by 
WDP. Although there were other places for these animators to practice their craft, working for 
Disney’s studio was more about the experience than the money. There was something special 
about working at a place like Disney’s studio. For many artists, it was truly a place where dreams 
could come true, but for some, the untenable schedules and arbitrary pay scales were part of a 
recurring nightmare. 
On February 6, 1941, Walt Disney addressed the issue of unionization in a memorandum 
circulated to all of his employees. According to Disney, “footage output of the plant for the past 
six weeks has dropped 50%.”116 Babbitt, Hilberman, and other leaders in the animation 
department were viewed as the cause of this problem. Disney explained that it had become 
“obvious that a great deal of valuable studio time is being consumed in discussing union 
matters.”117 Not only were the union organizers stealing company time, they were being accused 
of out-and-out ignorance by Disney. “Due to world conditions,” Disney added, “the studio is 
facing a crisis about which a lot of you are evidently unaware.”118 Feeling that his warnings were 
falling on deaf ears, Disney decided to haul his entire staff into the studio’s auditorium for a 
more personal lecture just a few days after distributing this memo. 
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Disney addressed his employees directly on February 10 and 11, 1941. He began by 
reminding his staff that he had once been a starving artist. Disney recalled that “In 1923…I went 
three days without eating a meal, and I slept on some old canvas and chair cushions in an old rat-
trap of a studio for which I hadn’t paid any rent for months.”119 Although Walt and his brother, 
Roy, had managed to make it to Hollywood, the Great Depression allegedly threatened their 
cartoon enterprise. After Roosevelt had called for the Bank Holiday in 1933, many of the major 
studios tried to agree on a fifty percent pay cut for their employees in order to stay afloat. Disney 
was particularly proud of himself because he withstood pressure to do the same. “I was badgered 
and threatened by the other studios,” he explained, “for not falling in with their… plan.”120 
Instead, Walt and Roy had agreed to cut their artists pay by only ten percent.  
Moreover, Walt and Roy were still making personal sacrifices for the benefit of WDP. 
“For years,” Walt expounded, “we have been paying income tax on…salaries and…dividends we 
never received.”121 Disney blamed the studio’s recent downturn on the collapse of foreign 
markets, not his over-ambitiousness with films like Fantasia. “The war in Europe had 
depreciated our markets,” Disney shared, “that wasn’t so bad till Hitler started his Blitzkrieging 
[sic], and then the foreign market completely disappeared.”122  Of all the details provided in 
Disney’s pep talk, he omitted the critical points at which he and other WDP executives had 
deliberately violated provisions of the Wagner Act. 
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An official complaint against WDP, signed by William Walsh, was filed by the NLRB on 
May 8, 1941.123 The NLRB had been made aware of the numerous attempts by Disney 
executives to strong-arm the studio’s artists into joining the company union. Paragraph five of 
the NLRB complaint specifically outlined the FSC’s “frustration of organizational attempts 
among the company’s employees” to sign on with the SCG and affiliate themselves with the 
AFL.124 Furthermore, the complaint demonstrated that Disney executives had knowingly violated 
federal law for quite some time. Paragraph seven confirmed that “the course of conduct set out in 
paragraph five…interfered with, restrained and coerced [WDP] employees in the exercise of the 
rights” afforded to them under Section 7 of the Wagner Act. Although there was more than 
enough in the NLRB complaint to show Disney’s wanton disregard for the U.S. Constitution 
when it did not suit his needs, insult was added to injury when Disney decided to terminate the 
contract of Babbitt and other artists in retaliation for their attempts at independent unionization. 
Dipping into his animator’s palette of hyperbole, Sito described the scene of Babbitt’s 
termination, as other “sullen, silent artists gathered in the hallways, flanked by security guards,” 
turning the halls of Disney’s animation building into “a Toon Town via dolorosa: the creator of 
Goofy was being fired, for them.”125 In a demonstration of solidarity, Disney’s artists struck at 
his studio on May 29, 1941.  
Given the fact that the strikers were artists—not muscular auto or steel workers—Walt 
Disney and his allies viewed them as vulnerable. While the SCG allied itself with Sorrell—and 
eventually the CSU—the American Society of Cartoonists, a sequel to the company union, 
counted on its affiliation with the IATSE for the sake of keeping up appearances. Though actual 
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violence was a rare occurrence during the Animator’s Strike, there were instances where artists 
like Babbitt were confronted by dangerous situations. According to several witnesses, rumors 
circulated that Disney attempted to run Hilberman over with his car on the way into the studio 
one morning.126 Sorrell, however, recalled a much more dangerous encounter between 
representatives of the SCG and the IATSE’s hired goon, Willie Bioff.  
 Disney’s relationship with Bioff and the IATSE was caricatured by SCG artists.127 
Although their medium was cartoons, their satirical wit belied the danger inherent in some of 
Disney’s coercive strike-breaking tactics. One evening during the strike, “Joe Tuohy, of the 
Teamsters, and Aubrey Blair, international organizer for the AFL…whisked away” Sorrell, 
Babbitt, and others for an unscheduled meeting at Bioff’s secluded ranch in the valley.128 A June 
news article confirmed all but a few details of Sorrell’s account of the meeting. According to a 
special correspondent for PM Magazine, a left-leaning daily published in New York during the 
1940s, the clandestine meeting held at Bioff’s residence had been arranged and attended by 
Gunther Lessing.129 Lessing encouraged the artists and Sorrell to sign with the IATSE. However, 
the SCG strikers refused to entertain the proposal, especially with Bioff leading the negotiations. 
Lessing defended Bioff’s presence and insisted that “Bioff was not dictating terms, he was just 
trying to help.”130 Although few employees at Disney’s studio held IATSE membership cards, 
Lessing and Bioff had arranged a deal to allow films produced by Disney to include IATSE 
certification in their credits. When the IATSE’s projectionists began organizing a sympathy 
																																								 																				
126 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 71-2; Sito, Drawing the Line, 130. 
127  “Here Are Your Answers,” ca. 1941, MPSCG. 
128 Sorrell, You Can’t Choose Your Friends, 71. According to Sito, Dave Hilberman was being driven to the same 
meeting in a separate vehicle, but he threatened to jump out the moving car once he realized what was happening, 
see: Sito, Drawing the Line, 136. 
129 “Bioff Unions Sign with Disney; Disregard Strike,” PM Magazine, July 10, 1941, MPSCG. 
130 “Bioff Unions Sign with Disney.” 
39 
strike in support of the animators, however, Bioff swiftly quashed their efforts. The SCG needed 
Bioff’s help like they needed another hole in their head, and if Sorrell and Babbit had not cut that 
evening’s meeting short, then they might have received the latter. 
As an unofficial enforcer for the IATSE, Bioff operated outside of the law, but that made 
little difference. Local law enforcement was bought and paid for too. Sorrell recalled that, 
“Disney hired fifty guards and policemen, ex-LA policemen, and lined them up in front of the 
picket line. They were put there to push the picket line and run them off.”131 Sorrell was able to 
muster counter-reinforcements through Elmer Adams, Chief and friendly contact at the Burbank 
police department. Sorrell also arranged for longshoremen, wrenches in hand, to protect the 
artists encampment at night. By August, even the Teamsters Union had rallied to protect the 
artists’ flank.132 As Babbitt resisted Disney’s pressure to abandon the SCG, he became the victim 
of relentless harassment. Babbitt was arrested by Burbank police on an alleged concealed 
weapons charge the same day he was to give testimony before the NLRB in the 1941 dispute.133  
Some of the demonstrations by strikers blurred the lines between violence and comradery. 
During one demonstration, several artists dressed as executioners and paraded about with a 
working guillotine.  
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Figure 2.2, “Happy Birthday Walt!” ca. 1941, MPSCG, image used courtesy of the 




As shown in Figure 2.2 above, the demonstrators carried a sign that conveyed sardonic 
birthday greetings to Lessing and Disney. The crowd also sang a parody of the French national 
anthem, Les Marseillais. Among the lyrics quoted by Sito, the artists sang: “We will put the ax to 
Gunther Lessing, and the mess of boners he’s made.”134 The strikers——beheaded an effigy of 
Lessing, over and over.135 Disney and Lessing were no match for the demonstrators’ wit and 
knack for musical parody. According to a column in the Daily Worker, the artists 
“expressed…utter contempt for Lessing,” and his former client, Pancho Villa, by singing La 
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Cucaracha “as he crossed the picket line each morning.”136 Although the demonstration of 
fraternité made by the Disney artists may have been jarring to some members of the American 
public, support for the strikers poured in from all over.  
Naturally, there was support from other studios’ animation departments in the motion 
picture industry. Animators working at Warner Brothers were allowed, by their employer, to 
leave early and participate in the demonstrations outside of Disney’s studio. According to 
Sorrell, the artists had some fun at the expense of Leon Schlesinger, the head of Warner 
Brothers’ animation department, when he came out himself in a show of support for Disney’s 
artists. Sorrell recalled, “while I was talking to [Schlesinger], the sound wagon blasted out, ‘Herb 
Sorrell is now speaking to Leon Schlesinger, who has signed a very nice agreement with the 
[SCG].’”137 That was the first and only time Schlesinger showed up at one of the demonstrations, 
but support for the strikers was coming from the most unlikely of places for the SCG, an AFL 
affiliate.  
Worried about the physical well-being of his fellow strikers, Babbitt pled for aid at a 
Burbank CIO leadership meeting. This was either an incredibly genius move or an act of 
desperation. The AFL, which was backing the efforts of Babbitt and other Disney’s artists to sign 
with the SCG, had expelled John Lewis, who founded the far more radical CIO. According to 
Sito, Babbitt was “politically naïve” and did not understand the implications of an AFL-backed 
union leader making such a bold request.138 Nevertheless, Babbitt’s appeal touched the heart of 
the Archdiocese for the Roman Catholic Church, and food was delivered to the strikers within a 
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few days. Other CIO leadership made public displays of their support for Disney’s artists. Harry 
Jung, President of the CIO affiliated office workers’ union had a change of heart while escorting 
a young lady to a screening of Fantasia at the Carthay Circle theatre. Rather than cross the 
boycott line outside, Jung and his date surrendered their tickets to demonstrators and the two 
“grabbed a spot on the line.”139  The picket lines had moved beyond the gates of WDP and stood 
between American consumers and their access to movie theaters. 
New York City’s working-class press had also taken an interest in the story behind the 
Animator’s Strike. Babbitt, himself, became the subject of an interview with Charles Glenn, 
Hollywood columnist. According to the article in the Daily Worker, Babbitt was “well-paid” and 
“not quite what [one could] expect of a strike leader.”140 For Babbitt, the Animator’s Strike was 
about recognition and freedom of expression above all else. “This is a belt-line business,” 
Babbitt explained, “and your talents go to creating something for somebody else.”141 Most 
importantly, Babbitt felt that demonstrations held during the strike showed the real potential of 
his fellow artists. “It’s bringing out talents in the kids they never had a chance to use, talents we 
never bothered to find before,” he boasted, “they feel…they’re actually creating something and 
they feel they’re free men.”142 That second comment from Babbitt was suggestive of the 
common issues between WDP and the SCG that related to matters of gender. 
Women artists dealt with Disney’s patronizing pay scales and grueling schedules just like 
their male counterparts. It also was worth mentioning that a woman, Margaret Winkler, “the 
‘Great Live-Wire Saleslady of Warner Bros.,” facilitated some of the earliest opportunities for 
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Walt Disney when he arrived in Hollywood, fresh off the train from Kansas City in his early-
twenties.143 During the pep rally held by Disney in February of 1941, he tried to portray himself 
and the studio as champions for women’s rights in the workplace. Walt addressed a rumor that 
he and other executives were “trying to develop girls for animation to replace higher-priced 
men.”144 While Disney touted his views on gender equality in the workplace, there was reason to 
be skeptical. His explanation of the gossip was just a patronizing as the rest of his speech. 
Although Disney stated, that “if a woman can do the work as well, she is worth as much as a 
man,” he also concluded by suggesting “girl artists,” not women, “have the right to expect the 
same chances for advancement as men.”145 Excepting a handful of experiments, authorized and 
overseen by Walt personally, and employees in WDP’s Ink and Paint Department, women’s 
labor had been relegated to domestic duties like cooking and cleaning. For the most part, 
opportunities for upward mobility were virtually non-existent for women working at Disney’s 
studio.  
The SCG’s picket lines were no shining examples of gender equality, and the gendered 
stratification of labor was not confined to the cartoon factory’s production line. In late-June 
1940, People’s World ran a profile on Libbie Hilberman which was written by Charles Glenn.146 
Libbie was the spouse of SCG Secretary, Dave Hilberman, so she was keenly aware of the series 
of close encounters between the organizing artists and Disney which led to their decision to 
strike. “Many of us were frightened by the whole thing,” Hilberman told Glenn, “but we 
swallowed what fears we might have, plunged on to the picket line and into the strike 
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kitchen.”147 The SCG’s Women’s Auxiliary became vital to the maintenance of morale among 
the strikers. In addition, the Women’s Auxiliary assisted with other domestic duties. As Glenn 
reported, Mrs. Cy Young opened the doors of her home as a makeshift “nursery school…for 
mothers who feel their place is on the picket line with their husbands.”148  
Libbie Hilberman also expressed great concern with the hostile anti-labor press and its 
reporting on the strike, but she reassured Glenn and his readers that the women could hold the 
line. A sister SCG Women’s Auxiliary Unit from the Warner Brothers animation department 
assisted in mobilizing boycotts of Disney’s merchandising products. Among the notable women 
on this boycott committee was Dorothy Jones, spouse of the renowned animator, Chuck Jones.149 
Glenn explained to his readers that Libbie was an extremely busy woman and had to cut their 
interview short to prepare for a demonstration that evening. “We’re together,” she insisted, “and 
we’re fighting for the same thing and believe me…we’re fighting.”150 Whether or not Libbie 
Hilberman’s words reached Walt Disney was of little consequence. Women artists employed by 
Disney benefited from the advocacy of the SCG’s Women Auxiliaries.  
All of this was to say, the Animator’s Strike at Disney’s studio in 1941 was not the work 
product of a handful of subversive types who managed to infiltrate the sanctity of WDP. The 
SCG’s Disney Unit received multi-lateral support from Hollywood’s diverse labor scene. 
Babbitt, Hilberman, and other Disney artists were becoming part of something much larger than 
they had imagined. Although it involved far less bloodshed and had no explicit connections to 
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the Popular Front, the overall strategy of the SCG mimicked that of the Little Steel Strikes of 
1937.151 One by one, animation departments of other major motion picture studios had toppled 
like dominoes in acquiescence to the SCG’s demands. Sorrell was one of the catalysts that set 
these events in motion. After entering into a deal between the SCG and the animation department 
at the Warner Brothers Studio, Schlesinger asked Sorrell, “Now, what about Disney?”152 At 
Disney’s studio, nothing was impossible. The impossible just took a little longer. The artists 
received tangible and moral aid from other industrial workers in Hollywood and the liberal-
leaning press. It would also be a fair assessment to say that the art form they created was at stake 
for those who colored outside the lines of Disney’s studio in 1941. The art of animation had 
become political as well as ideological, and the Animator’s Strike only reached its conclusion 
after Disney had left the country for Central and South America. He and his studio’s executives, 
however, had already turned their attention to public and private defense contracts to secure 
WDP’s financial solvency. 
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This chapter focuses on the significance of the contract work performed by Disney’s 
studio as a service to the federal government, the ideologies incorporated into these productions, 
and the lasting impression Disney’s Good Neighbor productions left on consumers in the western 
hemisphere. Chiefly, the relationship between the ideology underpinning Disney’s labor troubles 
and his state-sponsored travels through Central and South America were more complicated than 
some corporate historians have concluded. The evidence presented in this section shows that 
while Disney’s studio gained institutional support from the public and private sectors, his 
motivations for participating in these projects were self-serving, and the ideology that governed 
these productions left an indelible mark on a transnational base of consumers.  
As the labor protests continued in Hollywood, Disney gathered a handful of loyal artists 
and employees and headed south. Their expeditions into Central and South America were carried 
out under the auspices of the Coordinator of Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), Nelson 
Rockefeller.  Representing a departure from Disney’s labor troubles, albeit a temporary one, 
Walt Disney Productions, Ltd. (WDP) entered into a contract with the OIAA by the summer of 
1941. Though there was some initial trepidation expressed by members of Hollywood’s elite 
regarding the labor-management crisis at Disney’s studio, the OIAA threw caution to the wind. 
WDP became ingratiated in Good Neighbor diplomacy and championed hemispheric solidarity. 
Disney’s studio surpassed the federal government’s aims for the project while adhering to a 
dogma set by the Motion Picture Society for the Americas (MPSA). More importantly, other 
businessmen and Hollywood filmmakers failed where Disney found success. Orson Welles, 
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Disney’s rival in both ambition and budgetary requirement, embarked on a similar mission. 
Welles, however, returned from his trip with little to offer the American public. Disney’s Good 
Neighbor productions were no doubt entertaining, but they also misrepresented and exploited the 
cultures of Central and South Americans for U.S. audiences. Walt Disney’s Good Neighbor 
productions furthered a right-wing ideology laced with U.S. imperialism.  
Patron Saint of Hollywood Animation 
Although John Hay Whitney had oversight over all the Hollywood filmmakers who 
participated in Good Neighbor diplomacy, he reported directly to Nelson Rockefeller, the son of 
the oil baron and Coordinator of the OIAA. Hollywood’s elite rushed to support the efforts of 
Rockefeller’s OIAA. For the purposes of facilitating collaboration between the U.S. 
“government… industry, and people of other nations,” the Motion Picture Society for the 
Americas (MPSA) was formed in March 1941—only two months prior to the Animator’s Strike 
at Disney’s studio.153  The MPSA brought together all types of industry executives. For example, 
Walter Wanger, one of Hollywood’s Progressives, worked with the MPSA on behalf of the 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (AMPAS). Wanger was tasked with 
“[ingratiating, or] acquainting the industry with basic economic, political, and social trends,” 
mainly with an emphasis on cultural engagement.154 Wanger supported Roosevelt and his New 
Deal policies, but the AMPAS itself was little more than a smoke screen. According to labor 
scholars like Murray Ross, the AMPAS was a larger industrial organization created to placate 
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Actors, Actresses, and Screenwriters.155 As Gerald Horne would also confirm, “The initiation of 
the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences in 1927 was a direct response to…earlier 
growth of union sentiment in Hollywood.”156  
Disney’s work for the OIAA was more than just a distraction from his labor woes. As 
suggested in Walt and El Grupo—a documentary produced by the Walt Disney Family 
Foundation in 2010—Disney and his travelling companions were greatly concerned about the 
unresolved labor troubles plaguing the cartoon factory that they were leaving behind.157 Even if 
Walt and El Grupo wished to forget them, there were constant reminders awaiting their arrival in 
South America. According to Tom Sito, in preparation for Disney’s arrival, “the AFL contacted 
the heads of the labor unions in South American countries” and ensured that Walt and his artists 
were greeted by the jeers of “picketing longshoremen.”158  
Disney also had a labor expert of his own on one of the MPSA’s committees. Gunther 
Lessing, vice president and corporate counsel for WDP, chaired the MPSA’s committee that was 
tasked with finding and encouraging projects that could be funded by the federal government, 
completed at a rapid pace, and broadly distributed, thereby increasing the efficiency of the 
OIAA’s Motion Picture Division.159 Negotiating a contract between WDP and the federal 
government became an insurance policy for Disney’s livelihood. Herb Sorrell’s alliance with the 
SCG became a clear and present danger to Disney’s financial solvency. 
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According to Walt Disney’s HUAC testimony, Sorrell had threatened to “make a dust 
bowl out of [Disney’s] plant” during the Animator’s Strike.160 This was a particularly evocative 
image for a Midwesterner like Disney. As Mike Wallace noted, Walt had grown up as the son of 
a failed, disgruntled farmer “who voted consistently for Eugene Debs and subscribed to” socialist 
periodicals.161 In his oral history, Sorrell admitted to taking steps in order make good on his 
threat, but he did not use the dust bowl terminology. After a representative from the federal 
government had been sent to facilitate discussions between Disney and the strikers, negotiations 
remained at a stalemate. A NLRB representative asked Sorrell to find out which bank was 
funding Disney’s studio. After some research, Sorrell was referred to “Doc” Giannini, founder of 
Bank of Italy—later named Bank of America, the principal source of Disney’s investment 
capital.162 Giannini suggested that Sorrell try to arrange for Jim Russell, who had arbitrated 
disputes between the United Auto Workers and Henry Ford during the mid-1930s.163 Sorrell was 
more interested in a guarantee that Disney, himself, would agree to arbitration. Giannini 
provided reassurance to Sorrell by stating, emphatically, that Disney would “arbitrate or he 
won’t have any studio.”164 Executive leadership of the OIAA and MPSA threatened Disney’s 
future as well. 
In early-July, Whitney had a telephone conversation with an OIAA advisor, John 
Lockwood. During the call, the two gentlemen discussed how Disney’s “labor difficulties” may 
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adversely affect their current plan to enter into a contract with WDP.165 While Lockwood 
appeared concerned, Whitney was not. In response, Lockwood explained that if Disney was 
going to cease participation in the planned travel to Central and South American, then “it might 
well be in the interest of the Government that we should make such a contract.”166 Neither 
Lockwood nor Whitney had any reason to believe that Disney and his artists would abort their 
mission. Lockwood further “advised [Whitney] that the Government could not reimburse Mr. 
Disney for expenses already incurred voluntarily.”167 With regard to the Animator’s Strike at 
Disney’s studio, the choice for the OIAA was a simple one: Rockefeller and Whitney could 
disregard the labor-management dispute and enter into the contract with WDP, or “give up the 
whole thing.”168 Whitney agreed to take the matter under advisement and decide within the 
week. 
On July 17, 1941, Kenneth Thomson, an actor and Chief Executive for the MPSA, made 
his concerns regarding the negotiations of the Disney contract explicitly known to Whitney and 
Rockefeller. First, Thomson feared that “No statement…could alter the fact that Disney would 
be given the semblance of government sanction at a time when he has involved himself in a very 
unpleasant labor controversy.”169 In Thomson’s view, not only was Disney embarrassing himself 
by refusing to negotiate with the independent SCG, he stood to threaten the global reputation of 
the MPSA and OIAA. Second, Thomson emphasized that “important and honest elements of 
labor in the motion picture industry…will bitterly resent” government subsidies being granted 
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“to Disney so long as he is allied with Bioff.”170 The IATSE and Bioff had strong-armed several 
trade unions from major Hollywood studios, and Disney’s was no exception. Thomson felt this 
was need-to-know information for government officials like Rockefeller and Whitney. 
Thomson’s third and final concern regarded the extremely precarious situation the OIAA risked 
by blessing the “unholy alliance…mixing the Rockefeller Committee, the creator of Mickey 
Mouse, and a convicted Chicago panderer now under [federal] indictment…for extortion.”171 
Thomson pulled no punches when he concluded with a threat to tender his resignation as Chief 
Executive of the MPSA should the government enter into the proposed pact with Disney and his 
studio. Nevertheless, the OIAA entered a compact with WDP and enlisted Donald Duck into 
government service on August 5, 1941.172 Thomson became the MPSA’s pound of flesh by 
December 1941, when he was succeeded as the organization’s chief executive by Wanger of the 
AMPAS.  
One of the important provisions of Disney’s initial contract with the OIAA was that it 
took effect retroactively, meaning it provided for budgetary expenses from July 1, 1941 
onward.173 This did not allow for reimbursement of corporate expenditures for Disney and his 
crew, but it did ensure that Disney’s studio received an influx of federal funding while it was in 
violation of the Wagner Act. More importantly, the OIAA Contract was an insurance policy for 
Walt and El Grupo, as they came to be referred to by Central and South Americans.174 It offered 
Disney financial shelter in the event that his cartoon factory manufactured a dud. Paragraph nine 
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of the contract stated that “the Coordinator [Rockefeller] agreed to indemnify the Contractor 
[WDP] against any loss…[though] such indemnity shall not exceed $150,000.”175 It was 
contractually impossible for Disney to fail in his expansion into Central and South American 
markets. The commercial failures of Pinocchio and Fantasia, combined with the shrinking 
European markets for American motion pictures, crippled by World War II, signaled that there 
would have been no legacy for Walt Disney to protect if his studio’s public-private partnership 
with the OIAA did not pan out. The indemnity clause in paragraph nine was a failsafe against 
commercial failure, but its invocation never became necessary. Moreover, due to the perception 
of Disney’s success, the contract was renegotiated sometime later, and its budgetary allowances 
were increased.176 Even Rockefeller’s OIAA had the courtesy to reward its contractors with 
raises commensurate to their successes. 
Between 1942 and 1945, an anonymous chronicler for the MPSA documented over fifty 
motion pictures, a mixture of short subject and feature-length projects, created by the Disney 
studio while under the supervision of the OIAA. Twenty-two were pedagogical experiments, 
covering topics ranging from public health to natural resource extraction. Of the ten productions 
released in theatres, making them for-profit ventures, four were designated as war films. As Sito 
has pointed out, most of this work was completed by artists who were considered scabs by some 
of the SCG’s members.177 One notable exception was Ward Kimball—who animated the “Jim 
Crow” sequence in Dumbo (1941) and later expressed contempt for the “Disney despots” that he 
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and the other artists labored under.178 Nevertheless, Walt Disney became the most decorated 
Hollywood executive to participate in the OIAA’s diplomatic mission. “Rightfully,” the 
anonymous MPSA historian pondered, “What would Hitler do if he had a Disney?”179 
Thankfully, global events never provided an answer to that rhetorical question. As the nation 
crept closer to direct involvement in the War, Disney stayed the course. U.S. foreign policy in 
Central and South America passed the narrow threshold between its reliance on soft power and 
outright militaristic intervention. Donald Duck, the cultural attaché, remained an asset of the U.S. 
government for the duration of that transitional period. 
Los Caballeros Transnacionales 
Of the numerous shorts and feature-length films produced by Disney in the service of the 
OIAA’s Motion Picture Division, two films stood out for the messages they conveyed to 
American audiences. Saludos Amigos (1942) blended the medium of animation with live-action 
travelogue, but it also demonstrated U.S. insensitivity towards the native cultures of other 
sovereign nations and the bodies of their women.180 Even before its theatrical release, Saludos 
Amigos became the subject of criticism, but public opinion softened as WDP and the OIAA 
worked their magic in Central and South America. The Three Caballeros (1945), a follow-up 
film, was more problematic because it over emphasized stereotypical hyper-sexualization of 
Central and South American women. Furthermore, it reduced American men to fowl-mouthed 
sexual predators, one of whom was armed with a pair of six-shooters.181 Misogyny had a 
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relatively minor presence in Saludos Amigos, whereas the Caballeros took the sexist themes and 
multiplied their intensity by three.  
For several reasons, namely the sanctity of Disney’s corporate image, Donald Duck—not 
Mickey Mouse—did most of the heavy lifting at WDP during the 1940s. According to animation 
scholar Nic Sammond, “the labor of animation is incredibly important as work whose product is 
actually a visual and auditory commentary on itself.”182 Mickey Mouse had come to represent all 
that was exceptional about the United States. Mickey’s perseverance, for example, became a 
salve for the ailing spirits of U.S. consumers during the Great Depression. By the mid-1930s, 
Mickey’s wholesome status had become critical to the Disney business model. As Sammond 
added, “Mickey’s celebrity and Disney’s promotional skills made of the mouse a synecdoche, 
one that seemed poised to overshadow not only any other cartoon character of the era but also 
the craft and industry as a whole.”183 Donald provided an ideal channel for U.S. debauchery 
directed towards Central and South America. “However wild Mickey might once have been and 
however much he might still look like a minstrel…he was not allowed to drink, smoke, or act too 
violently,” Sammond argued, “the company had created Donald as an outlet for the pent-up 
creative energies of its animators.”184 Mickey Mouse could count his blessings for his not being 
invited to participate in Donald Duck’s depravity in Central and South America during the 
1940s.  
Before it was released in theaters internationally, Saludos Amigos began as four different 
animated shorts which were intended to highlight cultural expressions of Peru, Bolivia, 
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Argentina and Brazil.185 Disney made a last-minute decision, likely commercial, to synthesize 
them into a feature-length film with a longer run time. Donald starred as an American tourist 
visiting Peru during the opening short, Lake Titicaca, and another featured Pedro, a young, 
Argentinian mail plane, who braved the Andes mountains to ensure his precious cargo was 
delivered.186 Of the four short vignettes, Gaucho Goofy became the most controversial. The 
premise of the cartoon conflated the gaucho culture of Argentinians with that of the American 
Cowboy, which was reduced to a spectacle as Goofy bumbled his way through the sequence. 
Goofy also wore a brightly colored costume that was purported to be traditional gaucho dress. 
The final sequence of Saludos Amigos, however, focused on the rhythmic Samba, popular among 
Brazilians. In this short, Donald was introduced to a sultry, female dance partner by a suavely 
dressed parrot. This cigar-smoking, native of Rio de Janeiro, was appropriately named José “Joe” 
Carioca.187 Only the silhouettes of Donald and the woman were visible to audiences as the two 
danced, leaving his arousal implicit. 
In The Three Caballeros, Donald Duck headed south of the border once more and took 
center stage in a film that was even more sexually exploitative than Saludos.188 Donald reprised 
his role as a representation of the Anglo-American male, and “Joe” Carioca—the embodiment of 
Brazil’s middle class—came back to whisk Donald away on another carnal journey through 
Central and South America. This time, the Pan-American pair were joined by Panchito, trigger-
happy rooster and derogatory Mexican stereotype.189  Throughout the film’s production, 
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Disney’s studio attempted to keep the feature’s content a surprise for audiences. For all the 
secrecy surrounding production on The Three Caballeros, the exploits of these “chappies in 
serapes” left little to the imagination for male audiences when the film was released in 
theatres.190  
Donald’s abhorrent, misogynistic behavior had always been part of his charm. Scholars 
such as Leo Chavez, however, have argued that images of Central and South American women, 
such as those portrayed in The Three Caballeros, have been used to perpetuate the harmful 
stereotype of the “hot Latina.”191 In one sequence, José encouraged Donald to turn his masculine 
gaze to a group of female sunbathers on an Acapulco beach, so the bodies of these Latina women 
were clearly there for the Caballeros’ consumption. Latinas, according to Chavez, were often 
portrayed in media “as exotic, sexually aggressive, flirtatious women who…have more sexual 
partners than their white counter parts.”192 In an extension of the scene from Saludos Amigos, 
Donald vies for the affection of Brazilian performer, Aurora Miranda, while several other males 
stalk her through the streets to the tune of Os Quindins de Yayá.193 While lusting after the South 
American woman, Donald was consumed by a hormonal frenzy. Together, Donald, José and 
Panchito exemplified the Pan-Americanism being championed by groups like the MPSA and 
Rockefeller’s OIAA.  
Problematic as they were, Disney’s Caballeros became a patriarchal symbol of 
hemispheric solidarity, but they were a tough trio to keep under wraps for very long. The truth 
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was they had trouble securing Mexican talent. Domestically, artists hired by Disney encountered 
hostility in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. According to animation historian J.B. Kaufman, José 
Molina—one of three siblings selected in Mexico to participate in The Three Caballeros by 
Disney and his crew—was forced to register for the U.S. selective service while crossing the 
U.S.-Mexico border in Laredo, Texas.194 Molina, however, was not a citizen of the U.S.—or 
even Mexico for that matter. He was a Chilean national who had only been living with Vincente 
and Carmen Molina in Mexico for a short time. As a result of her brothers’ being accosted by 
U.S. Border Patrol, Carmen Malina was forced to perform alone in the Mexican sequence of The 
Three Caballeros.195 Moreover, films like Saludos Amigos and The Three Cabarellos ensured 
that skin tone of Central and South Americans were lightened to U.S. standards. U.S. audiences 
preferred the whiter versions of their Good Neighbors. 
Not much of the initial criticism of Disney or the OIAA Motion Picture Division’s work 
was positive. By August 6, 1941, the Argentinian press had quite a bit to say about “Mickey 
Mouse pictures with a Latin American Background.”196 A halt to OIAA film making was 
suggested, until Disney and others’ work could be adequately reviewed by regional experts. 
According to J.R. Josephs, an OIAA contact at the Buenos Aires Herald, “film men…critics, 
theatre owners…[and] embassy officials” all expressed worries that Disney’s Central and South 
American work “produced more ill will than good.”197 Many critics also wondered whether 
Disney and U.S. officials expected people from other nations to be flattered by appearing in the 
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OIAA’s films. As Josephs explained in the words of one critic, “Yanquis [sic] believe that if they 
make a picture with…an Argentine background, Argentines will…immediately feel a warming 
of the heart for the States.”198 Local consultants felt that the U.S. empire was objectifying 
national and regional cultures in the same way that Donald, José, and Panchito objectified 
women.  
To say nothing of the hyper-sexualization of Donald’s Samba partner or the animated 
duck’s chauvinist attitudes, local artists and OIAA field agents found Disney and his artists’ 
appropriation of their culture offensive. As noted by animation historian, John Canemaker, 
“Florencio Molina Campos, an Argentinian artist famed for paintings of gaucho life, was 
consulted and gave a lecture-demonstration at the studio in full gaucho costume.”199 Disney’s 
loyalist animators took several liberties when applying Technicolor to Goofy’s outfit. As 
Canemaker added, “the final film…horrified Molina Campos because it spoofed everything he 
had taught and held sacred.”200 Criticisms, such as those expressed by Campos, softened over 
time. In October 1942, for example, an article in the Buenos Aires Herald praised Disney’s 
efforts in bringing Argentinian culture to motion picture theaters. Disney was making the 
unprecedented choice to screen Saludos Amigos “in South America before releasing it in his own 
country.”201 Disney enjoyed watching audience reactions to his films. According to the article, 
“One of the events which touched Disney the deepest on his trip…was the warm reception with 
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which the Bueno Aires audience greeted Fantasia.”202 Disney was not the only U.S. businessman 
to seek out profits south of the border.  
Against the advice of experts, Henry Ford—Walt Disney’s industrial hero—sought to 
exploit the Amazon rainforest for rubber production.203 The Good Neighbor films helped bring 
WDP back from the brink of financial ruin in the early-1940s. However, Ford’s failed rubber 
colony served more as a weigh station for foreign diplomats and was eventually abandoned by 
U.S. colonists in the mid-1940s. Unlike Disney’s Good Neighbor diplomacy, the ecology of the 
Amazon, itself, burst Henry Ford’s Americanist bubble. Be that as it may, Disney’s studio still 
trumpeted the mythical success of Fordlandia in The Amazon Awakens (1944), which according 
to Grandin, “celebrated Ford’s [colony] as one of the Amazon’s four great cities.”204 Ford’s 
failed rubber colony in the Amazon was not viewed as an example of his hubris. It came to 
represent the idea that U.S. capitalism, and the ideology that governed it, could be transplanted 
into the untamed wilds of the South American jungle. OIAA officials, however, asked WDP to 
dial back its over-enthusiastic portrayal of Ford’s Amazonian enterprise.  
For obvious reasons, Disney celebrated Ford’s hubristic expansion into the Amazon 
rainforest. In mid-May 1944, The Amazon Awakens became the topic of conversation in a letter 
addressed to Ben Sharpsteen, one of WDP’s Lead Animators assigned with aiding OIAA’s 
Motion Picture Division.205 Russell Pierce of the OIAA asked that the draft script be revised. 
Pierce requested that Disney remove phrasing that described Ford’s ambitious colonial project as 
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a “rush of men with vision.”206 Although Disney undoubtedly viewed Ford’s operation as 
visionary, Pierce believed the description was overstating matters. Pierce suggested the use of 
the word, “arrival,” as it would have provided a less enthusiastic description when compared to 
that of a “gold rush.”207 Once Disney had created an empire of his own, he was free to ignore 
those warnings. As Grandin noted in Fordlandia, the Adventureland section of Disneyland 
“featured a jungle river cruise on a boat called the Amazon Belle.” 208 Though the ride featured 
several exotic encounters with South American cannibals, it was likely a nostalgic interpretation 
of Disney’s expedition to Ford’s rubber plantation in 1941, arranged by the OIAA. 
More importantly, Disney was not the only Hollywood filmmaker commissioned by 
Rockefeller and the OIAA. Orson Welles tried to produce a celebratory, rather than an 
appropriative travelogue, but his political activism in Central and South America nearly damaged 
his career in the motion picture industry beyond repair. Nelson Rockefeller was not only the 
Coordinator for the U.S. Office of Inter-American Affairs, he was a member of the executive 
board at R.K.O. Radio Pictures, which distributed films for both Walt Disney and Orson 
Welles.209 Brazil was a high-value target for OIAA propaganda, but the OIAA needed more than 
the Caballeros if it was going to win over Brazil’s autocratic government. At the time, Brazil 
was led by Getúlio Vargas, who U.S. intelligence believed had surrounded himself with Nazi 
sympathizers.210 Rockefeller must have understood the implications of sending a director like 
Welles into Brazil. Welles was still riding the high of completing the cinematic masterpiece 
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Citizen Kane (1941), when he was approached about working for the OIAA.211 He was asked to 
expedite production on two follow-up films he was making, The Magnificent Ambersons (1942) 
and Journey into Fear (1943), in order to arrive in Brazil in time for Carnaval. Appropriately, 
the working title for Welles’ Central and South American anthology was: It’s All True. 
Welles, like Disney, became infatuated with the Brazilian Samba. By contrast, Welles 
was less concerned with the dance’s sexual undertones and intended to convey its rich cultural 
history to American audiences. Welles’ pro-black stance, however, was perceived as a threat by 
the film executives in the U.S. and executives in Brazil’s Vargas regime. When the initial Samba 
footage shot by Welles and his crew arrived in Hollywood, R.K.O. executives complained that 
he had only been filming “jiggaboos jumping up and down.”212 Unlike Disney, Welles was not 
interested in fetishizing the samba or its performers. He was attentive to the politics of preserving 
the native dance and its centrality to the festival of Carnaval. As Welles discovered, the Samba 
had originated with the Xango shaman, and it was practiced and disseminated from samba 
schools located in the city of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas—slums or tenement villages built into the 
morros, or elevated topography around large urban centers like Rio and São Paulo.213 Taking 
note of this, Welles insisted on arranging for Black Brazilian musical talent to be featured in his 
segment on the Samba.  
Traditionally, the Samba Schools from the favelas made Carnaval a celebration of inter-
racial and inter-class mixing.214 During the festival, everyone was equal in the rhythmic 
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vibrations of the infectious percussion. Praça Onze, or Plaza Eleven, was held dear by Afro-
Brazilians because it was a place in which they could revel outside of the impoverished and 
dangerous conditions of the favelas. More importantly, the plaza was a space where residents of 
the favelas could make themselves clearly visible to upper class Brazilians, the ruling elite, and 
the outside world. Afro-Brazilians participation in Carnaval, specifically by dancing the Samba 
in Praça Onze, was a spectacle that demanded a recognition of their humanity. Unfortunately, 
the prized Praça Onze was demolished by Vargas for an infrastructure project, demonstrating the 
autocrat’s contempt for Brazil’s underclass. Though the thoroughfare became one of the grandest 
of its kind in the world, the project was taxing for Brazilians of color in more than economic 
terms. As noted by Daryle Williams, “Avenida Presidente Vargas exacted tremendous costs, as 
the demolition work…brought down historic churches…hundreds of humble residences…and 
commercial establishments that housed working-class Cariocas.”215 Vargas was not only 
demolishing sites of cultural heritage for Black Brazilians, he was exiling them to the favelas. 
According to Hélio Alves de Brito, a civil engineer working for the Vargas administration, the 
construction of the Avenida Presidente Vargas was “…the City’s most important axis.”216 This 
was by design, in the evident plan to whiten the image of Rio’s population. Vargas and his 
Estado Novo regime celebrated the “disappearance of old constructions in the urban 
center…where one notes the poverty of the architectural elements…and…the structures’ 
disagreeable aspects.”217 The Vargas regime was exacting historical erasure of Black Brazilians 
in the physical realm. 
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As Welles had a strong desire to capture the samba in the voice of Brazil’s downtrodden, 
he chose a protest song, performed by Afro-Brazilian musician Sebastião Bernardes de Souza 
Prata—known as Grande Othelo—and composed by Herivelto Martins, as the backing track for 
his Samba sequence.218 The lyrics from de Souza Prata and Martins’ dissident ballad were 
unsettling to the Vargas regime: 
They’re going to do away Praça Onze, 
There’ll be no more Samba School… 
The Tamborim219 weeps, 
The entire morro220 weeps… 
And one day we will have a new square 
And will sing of your past.221 
 
In order to ensure his documentary piece on the Samba honored Black Brazilians, Welles 
arranged to have the Praça Onze reconstructed on one of his backlots. However, due to 
budgetary constraints, he and his crew were forced to shoot night scenes with anti-aircraft 
spotlights borrowed from the Brazilian military.222  
If Welles, in his attempt to reveal how the other half lived in Rio was metaphorically 
flipping the bird to the city’s bourgeoisie, then his dramatic retelling of a celebrated pro-labor 
story was a figurative middle finger in the eyes of Vargas. Welles was fascinated with the history 
of Samba, but he became enthralled with a local tale regarding a group of rural fishermen. These 
jangadeiros relied on traditional technology in their labor. Their vessels, called jangada, were 
makeshift rafts, composed of only a few tree trunks with a small sail attached.223 The 
jangadeiros’ labor was extremely dangerous and subject to exploitation by local elites in the 
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fishing villages. More importantly, the Vargas regime had ignored the plight of the jangadeiros 
when passing a series of social reforms that benefitted other segments of Brazil’s working class. 
Welles capitalized on the opportunity to retell the harrowing story of four jangadeiros who 
organized other fishermen and sailed over 1,500 miles—on a jangada—from their home in 
Ceára Beach in São Paulo to the harbor of Rio de Janeiro to demand social justice from the 
Vargas regime.224 The significance of this Brazilian, pro-labor movement was too great for 
Welles to ignore. 
As with his segment on the Samba, Welles plans for recreating the fishermen’s story 
became a political statement. Although the jangadeiros’ demonstration managed to force Vargas 
to acknowledge their status as secondary citizens, their leader, Manuel “Jacarté” Olímpio, was 
marked as a political dissident by the Brazilian government. Welles’ enthusiastic support for 
Jacarté’s activism led to some of the first accusations that he too was a Communist.225 Those 
accusations would follow him home to the U.S. Even worse, tragedy struck while Welles was 
staging the jangadeiros’ reenactment in the Rio harbor. Two massive waves caused a jangada to 
capsize. Though three of the four men aboard came to the surface, Jacarté—hero to the 
jangadeiros and Brazil’s struggling underclass—drowned as his son watched in horror from the 
shoreline.226 Jacarté died in the very same waters that he had navigated on his way to demand 
Vargas’ recognition of the fishermen’s union. TIME Magazine, who had run the story on the 
jangadeiros that originally captured Welles’ attention, summarized the grisly affair. In early-
June, human remains were found in the stomach of a shark caught off the coast.227 While the 
																																								 																				
224 It’s All True. 
225 It’s All True. 
226 It’s All True. 
227 “End of a Hero,” TIME Magazine 39, no. 23 (June 8, 1942): 42, EBSCO, accessed: December 2019. 
65 
experts were able to determine that the victim was a jangadeiro from the same region as Jacarté, 
no one could confirm that the limbs and head belonged to the Brazilian labor leader. 
As Welles stated in an interview, he believed his Good Neighbor adventure was doomed 
from the start. When funding was cut for a scene that was to feature an indigenous shaman—or 
“one of the voodoo witch doctors,” in Welles’ words—he wanted to discuss the matter 
personally in his office.228 Welles broke the bad news to the shaman, who took great offense 
because his tribe had invested in new costumes, then left his office. Upon Welles’ return, he 
found his script that was to feature the native performance had been pierced with a “long steel 
needle…the mark of voodoo,” according to Welles.229 In addition, Welles’ and his crew were 
subjected to street violence when trying to capture footage in Rio’s favelas. Adding insult to 
injury, R.K.O. executives forced Welles to make final edits to The Magnificent Ambersons and 
Journey into Fear, remotely, while he was antagonizing Vargas in Brazil. Worst of all, R.K.O. 
shelved the Welles project and held the negatives hostage for several years, until the director 
finally gave up on trying to option the rights to his work.230 Nearly half a century passed before 
the footage shot by Welles was seen by public audiences. 
While the plantations of Fordlandia became dried out husks after the industrialist failed in 
transplanting Americanism to the Amazon, and Welles returned from South America nearly 
unemployable, Disney became the most celebrated exemplar of Good Neighbor diplomacy and 
its advancement of U.S. interests. Disney’s work for and with the OIAA and MPSA was viewed 
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as an unparalleled success. Although the Disney studio’s apple polishing for Ford demanded 
some attention, it is worth noting that Henry Ford never set foot in Fordlandia.231 Furthermore, it 
was easy to understand why an auteur like Orson Wells might have been destined to fail from the 
start—and while he was on his similar expedition into Central and South America. Welles’ 
attitudes towards people of color and pro-labor views differed dramatically from those of Disney 
and Ford. Welles was attempting to highlight the struggles of the Brazilian underclass, but 
Disney was there to exploit their cultural resources and market his studios wares, just as any 
Good Neighbor would. Donald Duck was just chasing tail feathers. More critically, Disney tried 
to obfuscate the political messages embedded in his Good Neighbor propaganda with bright 
colors and light-hearted humor, whereas the subjects covered by Welles were overtly political. 
Welles’ and his crew were subjected to street violence when trying to capture footage in Rio’s 
favelas. The Chronicles of Disney were dutifully recorded by the anonymous MPSA historian, 
while Welles returned to Hollywood, branded a Communist by a Brazilian dictator. To the 
victor, go the spoils, especially in ideological warfare. 
 “Feathers Plucked and Well-Roasted” 
The efficacy of OIAA propaganda had begun to wane by the end of the 1940s. According 
to Sadlier, the OIAA, along with its Motion Picture Division, was decommissioned before the 
end of World War II.232 The Central and South American marketplaces for Disney’s films, 
comics, and other merchandise, however, remained intact. If, as Greg Grandin has argued, the 
same geographic spaces became the laboratory where the American empire honed its craft of 
nation building, then it was in that imperial “workshop” that Disney “ingratiated” his studio to 
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the U.S. military-industrial complex.233 The historical legacy of this transition became apparent 
after a few decades had passed. In the early 1970s, Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattellart, two 
Chilean cultural critics, rhetorically informed Disney’s corporation that it could have its duck 
back, “feathers plucked and well-roasted.”234 This was a strongly stated opinion but one with 
historical foundations. Until President Salvador Allende was unseated by force in 1973, Dorfman 
served as a cultural advisor to the Chilean government and Allende, personally. Between 1971 
and 1973, Dorfman partnered with Mattellart to pen a Marxist criticism of Disney’s brand of 
cultural imperialism and its deleterious impact on their fellow Chileans.235 According to cultural 
theorist, John Tomlinson, Dorfman and Mattellart’s How to Read Donald Duck was “as much a 
refusal of American consumer-capitalist values,” as it was a critique of Disney’s “ideological 
[impact] on Chilean society.”236  
Affection for Donald, the world’s most famous cartoon duck, was a difficult emotion to 
suppress, but the polarity of Disney’s polemic could be reversed. According to instructions 
provided by Dorfman and Mattellart, “to expel someone from the Disneyland Club,” one had to 
demonstrate that Disney was “trying to brainwash children with the doctrine of colorless social 
realism, imposed by political commissars.”237 Disney comics implied that adherence to class-
based stratification was required for an orderly society. As the Chilean critics further suggested, 
“Every Disney character stands either on one side or the other of the power demarcation line. All 
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those below are bound to obedience, submission, discipline, humility.”238 Furthermore, an 
underdeveloped nation like Chile could only aspire to be, at best, just behind nations like the 
U.S. in the emerging global order. Neo-colonialism would become a fact of life, and little could 
be done to compete with a global superpower like Chile’s hemispheric neighbor to the north. 
“Since the noble savage is denied the prospect of future development,” Dorfman and Mattellart 
argued, “…unbridled capitalist despoliation is programmed with smiles and coquetry.”239 
Dorfman and Mattellart’s criticism aimed for the metaphorical jugular vein of Disney, the 
company, and Walt, the man who was by then deceased. “Attacking Disney was no novelty,” 
they added, “he has often been exposed as the travelling salesman of the imagination, the 
propagandist of the ‘American Way of Life’, and a spokesman of ‘unreality’.”240 
As Allende was forced from office by the Augusto Pinochet regime, Dorfman and 
Mattellart fled Chile seeking political asylum. Their critique persevered as well. Disney media 
was more than “occasional entertainment,” Dorfman and Mattellart concluded, “it is our 
everyday stuff of social oppression.”241 According to John Tomlinson, copies of How to Read 
Donald Duck were rounded up and set ablaze during Pinochet’s violent coup d'état, clandestinely 
supported by the U.S.242 Although Donald Duck never personally piloted any military 
helicopters, he honorably served in the U.S. armed forces for several decades after his sojourn 
south of the border. This form of Disney-branded imperialism was a boon for U.S. foreign 
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THE AMERICAN ART OF WAR: DISNEY’S ENEMIES, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 
 
This chapter places Disney’s continued partnership with the federal government within 
the context of one of Hollywood labor’s most violent episodes. Labor leaders within the film 
industry faced an increasingly violent battle against assets of the state. Primarily, this section 
contrasted the wartime productions of Disney’s studio, mostly government-subsidized, with 
Hollywood labor’s continued struggle against corruption, violence, and other anti-union 
strategies on the domestic front.  
In the mid-1940s, Organizations like the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU) confronted 
insurmountable odds. The nation’s late entry into the Second World War had adverse effects on 
the U.S. labor movement, including the filmmaking industry. The IATSE was firmly entrenched 
on the backlots of the major motion picture studios like Walt Disney Productions, Ltd. (WDP). 
During its early years, the CSU had squared off against mob bosses and accusations of 
subversion, both employed by studio heads like Disney, but jurisdictional disputes continued 
within the growing labor movement. Sorrell was still there, leading men and women into battle 
under the banner of the CSU. With the moxie and support of other left-wing activists, the 
Hollywood labor movement’s militant faction persisted in their efforts to rid the trenches of the 
motion picture industry littered by sweetheart deals and conservative press. The public spectacle 
of a series of strikes, beginning in early-1945, however, granted more and more political capital 
to right-wingers trying to curtail union activity on a national level. By October, the violence was 
not metaphorical. Even worse, the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-
Hartley Act, was passed by Congress in 1947, fed the growing paranoia surrounding the spread 
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of Communism and increased accusations of subversive activity into deadly weapons on the 
battlefields of Hollywood. 
Victory through Animation 
Throughout the 1940s, once the U.S. officially entered the Second World War, the 
nation’s military-industrial complex became a proto-Disneyland. Disney’s studio became a state-
backed institution, and its engines were primed for psychological warfare on the domestic front. 
In 1940, Charles Glenn made a hyperbolic comment in a column for People’s World. Saddened 
by the industrialization of U.S. filmmaking as an artform, Glenn lamented, “[Hollywood] has 
imposed on itself the title of America’s Cultural Center…Maybe big business hasn’t heard of 
culture. Or, like [Joseph] Goebbels, reaches for its gun.”243 As time would reveal, Glenn’s 
remark was prescient. Months before the U.S. officially entered the War, Disney was working on 
Imagineering weapons-grade material in his cartoon factory. Disney had been redlining his 
animated war machine for years by the time the War neared its finale in 1945. Although the 
OIAA and OWI exercised some editorial control over Disney’s productions and told his artists 
“what to do,” he never did “just the opposite” and shuttered his studio.244 
For labor-management relations, as James Gross argued, “the war years provided the 
NLRB with a respite from the constant political pressure under which it had operated.”245 Since 
the beginning of 1942, organized labor had been under the jurisdiction of the National War 
Labor Board. The NWLB continued to quell labor-management disputes, but more importantly, 
it insulated the production of wartime industries.246 Even if they were over worked and under 
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paid, Disney’s artists could no longer strike against their employer without risk of being targeted 
as a national security threat. When WDP unleashed its Americanist menagerie on theatres during 
the War, it did so by exploiting its labor force. The artists who animated those characters were 
kept quite busy while Disney was in the business of warlording. 
In 1941, WDP released two memoranda to various defense production industries, mainly 
airplane manufacturers such as the Lockheed Company. One of these memos discussed technical 
training films. The sales pitch suggested that experts on pedagogy could “testify to the 
remarkable power of the animation medium to present…processes which ordinary photography 
cannot portray, nor personal instruction convey.”247 This unprecedented level of didacticism was 
innovative. Live-action subjects would gain “effectiveness, clarity and instructional value” by 
inserting “animated diagrams, graphs, maps or animated statistics.”248 Producing these subjects 
would result in little to no disruption of normal industrial operation. “An engineer or other 
representative of the client…sits down at a conference table in the Disney studio and tells his 
story to a group of highly trained mechanical draftsmen and artists.”249 Disney’s artists, as the 
best in the business, were crafting an invaluable product for industrial manufacturers of food, 
munitions, and war technology. The benefits provided by Disney’s “superbly equipped modern 
plant and the hundreds of…artists which Walt Disney could make available” would only be 
limited by the “imagination of your own instructors.”250 
On the same day, another memorandum was distributed, offering evidence that supported 
the use of Disney’s most popular characters in morale films. As suggested by this document, 
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“Cartoon characters…can painlessly put over lessons on touchy points,” such as, “aspects of 
morale and discipline problems.”251 Disney executives already had several new and original 
suggestions in mind for such characters. “Types of workmen common to every plant – the wise 
guy, the chronically tardy man, sloppy Joe, hasty Harry” could be dealt with on “screen in a 
friendly, good natured, and yet trenchant manner.”252 Not only would these Disney films be 
practical, they would also be entertaining. In one example provided, Disney executives suggested 
that a series of shorts could be built around a “‘Little Loud-mouth’, who talks entirely too much 
both in the plant and outside.”253 Some of Disney’s prized possessions were off limits, however. 
As Disney executives argued, the “irascible Donald Duck and the witless Goofy” were highly 
regarded examples according to “certain psychologists…since they carry over a wealth of earlier 
pleasant associations,” but Mickey Mouse was nowhere to be found on their list of suggestions. 
254  Moreover, Disney’s assistance to defense industries was not being offered for free. “Funny, 
fast-moving animation cartoons…with the inimitable Disney charm, of course, were “costly to 
produce.”255 The suggested morale films could be purchased in bulk to reduce costs. Disney 
executives offered a guarantee that the final pricing would be “substantially less than the well-
known short subjects…being produced for theatre distribution.”256 The only limitation of these 
films was that they comported to an orderly industrial setting. This idyllic setting, envisioned by 
Walt Disney, valued laborers’ subservience to their employers above all else. 
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Several times over, Disney’s studio had to be warned by government officials to temper 
the ideological messages of its wartime animated shorts and features. Increased production was 
the U.S. government’s chief goal in financing training films for defense industries, but it was not 
to be suggested at the expense of worker morale. Lowell Mellett, Director of the Office of War 
Intelligence’s (OWI) Bureau of Motion Pictures expressed his desire that Disney tone down its 
anti-labor rhetoric. In a letter written to R.S. Carr, who was handling the government and defense 
projects internally for WDP, Mellett provided some constructive criticism. The technical training 
films created for the Lockheed plant may have been “agreeable to the Lockheed company,” 
according to Mellett, but other “aircraft manufacturers” should have been able to decide for 
themselves whether they wanted to participate in Disney’s didactic experiments.257 The anti-
labor sentiment expressed in the second memorandum was more disconcerting to Mellett.  
In contrast to Mellett’s view on the potential for technical subjects, he informed Carr that 
he was “not sure that you are on equally safe ground in undertaking morale films using cartoon 
characters.”258 Disney might have been able to get a few laughs out of industrial workers, but 
they would not take kindly to becoming the butt of Donald Duck or Goofy’s gags. “The danger 
of cartoons,” Mellett added, “is that they hit awfully hard. Few can take it from a cartoon, except 
time-toughened politicians.”259 Mellett concluded that “nothing is worse than to have any 
employee made the butt of a joke by a superior.”260 That sort of criticism coming from outside 
the industrial setting was wholly unacceptable to Mellett. While Mellett professed that he was a 
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longtime fan of Disney’s productions, he was adamant about his warning to back away from 
insulting labor. 
While Disney’s studio produced a wide variety of wartime propaganda and leased its 
resources to numerous federal agencies, one feature was a constant for all these films. Every title 
card featured an IATSE certification, giving Disney’s operation the appearance of adhering to 
federal labor law. When the Japanese Empire launched its attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 
1941, many producers in the Hollywood film industry—Disney included—committed 
themselves to the U.S. war effort. According to film historian Leonard Maltin, no studio made a 
larger contribution “of its time and resources” to U.S. propaganda efforts than WDP.261 Disney’s 
cartoon factory in Burbank was even converted into a base for the U.S. armed forces. In spite of 
his patriotism, Walt Disney complained profusely when Navy commander Raymond Farwell 
occupied his office complex. According to Steven Watts, “Farwell not only slept in Disney’s 
bed…he apparently made a habit of walking through busy staff meetings in Disney’s office 
lugging a jar of pickles and dropping crumbs from an oversized sandwich.”262 Nevertheless, 
Disney was more than happy to pat his boys on the back for performing their patriotic duty.  
A press release distributed by WDP emphasized that “75% of the studios total output” 
had been devoted to government-sponsored propaganda.263 More importantly, the studio had 
shattered all previous records for footage produced since it opened. The press release vaunted the 
fact that “Old and new cartoon stars” were appearing in “settings of tanks and battleships.”264  
Disney believed that it had developed the perfect formula for merging entertainment with 
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training and morale films. Long before Walt Disney acquired the rights to produce an adaptation 
of P.L. Travers’ Mary Poppins (1964), WDP gloated that its “Sugar coated messages have 
always been easier to digest, and a coating of Mickey Mouse promises to be extremely 
palatable.”265 Global war was a bitter pill to swallow, but with far less effort, Disney could have 
channeled his factory’s saccharine resources into remedying his labor troubles. 
Many of the war films were relatively innocuous, even if some were glaringly insensitive. 
For example, Food Will Win the War (1942), sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
suggested to audiences that the “hope of American Agriculture” would win the War for the 
Allies.266 The narrator celebrated that American farmers outnumbered the Axis soldiers by a two-
to-one margin. These “embattled farmers are armed,” the faceless voice added in a militaristic 
tone. There was, however, no mention of the migrant labor critical to American agribusiness but 
unprotected by federal labor law.267 The short film made use of Disney’s artists to demonstrate 
how American food production dwarfed that of any other nation in the world.  
The animated sequences brought the impossible to life, as it showed the food processing 
industry had “canned enough vegetables to cover the wall of China,” and U.S. farmers had 
produced enough flour to “snow the German army in for another Russian winter.”268 Although 
the short was intended to be informative, it did have a few disturbing images. A morbidly obese 
woman, held aloft by a crane on a battleship, was used to symbolize all the oil and fat produced 
by U.S. manufacturers. Even worse, Disney’s Three Little Pigs ushered a horde of their fellow 
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swine off to American butchers, marching to the patriotic tune of fife and drum.269 If WDP had 
added any more huff and puff, then Disney’s studio might have blown down all the nation’s 
industrialized slaughterhouses. 
As with Disney’s OIAA films, Donald Duck seemed to steal the show. Other wartime 
shorts, like Education for Death: The Making of a Nazi (1943), were adapted from works by 
European expatriates.270 Donald, however, was featured in several animated classics from the 
era, including a few that were nominated for Awards by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences. Art Babbitt’s long-time friend, Bill Tytla was credited for his work on Der Fuehrer’s 
Face (1943), but the Oscar-winning, propaganda film was directed by Jack Kinney.271 In the 
short, Donald went through a jarring experience of being conscripted into the Third Reich’s 
defense production industry. The animation sequence featuring the film’s title song was sung by 
a marching band composed of German, Italian, and Japanese forces. The latter group was 
portrayed with exaggerated facial features, such as squinting eyes and bucked teeth.  
As the short feature progressed, the cartoon duck was forced to goosestep his way to the 
production line at a German munitions factory and give the Nazi salute while at the business end 
of several bayonets. Held at gunpoint, Donald was forced to work until he suffered a psychotic 
break. As Donald descended into madness, his arms and legs contorted into the shape of a 
swastika, and he hallucinated a portrait of himself becoming Adolph Hitler. When Donald woke 
up from his nightmare, he realized it was all a bad dream. The cartoon duck—still in his star-
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spangled pajamas, ran to his window and hugged a model of the Statue of Liberty, and declared 
his gratitude for being “a citizen of the United States of America.”272  
 The labor of Donald Duck was in high demand during the war years. In 1942, the OWI 
leased Donald Duck’s labor to Henry Morgenthau over at the U.S. Department of Treasury. 
Through this work, Donald Duck earned Disney’s studio another Oscar nomination. The New 
Spirit (1942), which was edited and re-issued the following year as The Spirit of ’43 (1943), 
encouraged citizens to pay their income taxes. 273  The short feature placed Donald in the role of 
an American taxpayer, suffering from a moral dilemma on payday. One half of Donald’s 
conscience, speaking in a Scottish accent and clad in a tartan kilt, informed him that the “War 
[was his] war too,” the narrator explained to audiences that paying income taxes was a 
“privilege,” not a duty.274 The other half of Donald’s taxpayer brain encouraged him to spend his 
money in the local Nazi dive bar. After some encouragement from the character who became the 
miserly Scrooge McDuck, however, Donald filed and paid his taxes.  
Innovative animation from The New Spirit, an example of the techniques hyped in the 
technical memo to defense industries, was repurposed and inserted into Spirit of ’43 after the 
sequence with Donald Duck. In these scenes, the narrator declared that the U.S. military-
industrial complex needed citizens’ taxes to fund American factories. The disembodied voice 
ominously demanded citizens’ “Taxes…for machine guns, anti-tank guns, long-range guns, 
guns, guns, guns…”275 By voluntarily withholding their periodic income tax payments, U.S. 
citizens could do their part in supporting the Allies abroad. The government needed its citizens’ 
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“Taxes to bury the Axis,” but several government officials questioned the efficacy of Donald 
Duck’s salesmanship.276  
Although Disney bragged to the press about how valuable Donald’s contribution was to 
the nation’s coffers, there was little evidence to support that U.S. taxpayers were affected by the 
good word spread by The New Spirit. The artists at Disney’s studio had contributed in numerous 
ways to government fundraising efforts, and some projects targeted children in particular. 
According to another press release distributed by WDP, the organization “inaugurated a 
campaign to promote the sale of War stamps to children.”277 Disney partnered with Random 
House to publish and distribute a stamp book. In addition to the book, which featured a 
“combination game and story featuring Disney characters, and…a practical lesson in thrift and 
patriotism,” Donald Duck’s voice actor, Clarence Nash, made personal appearances at retail 
locations participating in “The Victory March” campaign around the country.278 
In addition to his government contracts, Disney bankrolled a collaboration with Andrew 
De Seversky, a booster for the Lockheed aircraft company. Of all the works produced at 
Disney’s studio on behalf of the U.S. military-industrial complex, the wartime auteur believed 
Victory through Air Power (1943) to be his coup de grâce.279 Disney paid for the film’s 
production on Victory out of his studio’s war chest, so its content was not under the purview of 
the federal government. Unlike the government-sponsored war films, however, Victory was not 
well received by U.S. military officials. According to Steven Watts, officials from the U.S. Navy 
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lobbied against a film that advocated for diverting their funding to air power.280 Victory was 
more than another training exercise of morale film, however.  
Nelson Rockefeller personally congratulated Disney on his collaboration with De 
Seversky. Rockefeller told Disney, “Victory Through Air Power is singularly important in that it 
clearly demonstrates the almost limitless possibilities of the medium.”281 Five artists at Disney’s 
studio also pitched in by producing hundreds of pieces of nose art for warplanes and military 
insignia for other branches of the U.S. armed forces.282 The Allies drew inspiration from at least 
one of its scenes for use in live-fire operations. Disney and De Seversky may have dreamed it, 
but the Allied Powers had done it. Additionally, a new type of bunker-busting armament, which 
was developed by the U.S. and British military engineers. “The Disney Bomb Project” was 
inspired by one of Victory’s animated sequences. The Disney bombs were too large for 
conventional bombers. U.S. Bombardier Pat Spillman recalled that the weapons “had to be 
carried…under the wings of the B-17.”283 Only a handful of these bombs were used on combat 
missions in early-1945, but they proved effective in piercing the concrete shielding submarine 
bunkers and detonating inside. In Walt Disney’s mind, when Axis forces spotted one of his 
characters in the sky, they could be assured that death and destruction would follow. It was a 
dreary juxtaposition for Disney’s stable of animated characters. 
By the end of 1944, Disney was dealt a crushing blow in his personal war on labor. 
Disney, Lessing, and WDP tried for years to have the NLRB decision in favor of the SCG 
reversed. Between 1941 and 1944, WDP and its corporate counsel engaged in a protracted legal 
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battle with the NLRB, Art Babbitt, and the SCG. The result was a decision handed down from 
Justice Albert Stephens, Sr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
California on December 5, 1944.284 In the Ninth Circuit ruling, there was some poetic justice at 
work which provided a convenient summary of how the Animator’s Strike of 1941 ended. 
According to the decision, the strike ended in early-August with an arbitration that specifically 
referenced Art Babbitt’s wrongful termination and recommended he be rehired. Even though 
Disney complied with the award, Stephens noted, Babbitt’s immediate supervisor, Harold 
Adelquist, “purposefully avoided assigning [him] work.”285 Babbitt was terminated again in 
November 24, 1941 and enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps.  
In spite of the pleas from WDP attorneys, the Court refused to review any evidence or 
find fault in the NLRB’s decision that Disney had violated the Wagner Act. Not only did 
Stephens and the other Appellate Justices’ decide not to overturn the NLRB charges against 
WDP, it reissued the orders that Disney “cease and desist from discouraging membership in the 
[SCG]…or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any other artists from 
“exercising their right to self-organization.”286 Furthermore, Disney was ordered to pay Babbitt 
lost wages. To Disney and Lessing’s dismay, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the 
lower court’s decision, granting the NLRB and Babbitt final say in the matter. While Disney 
ultimately lost his battle against the SCG, Herb Sorrell had been actively resisting the IATSE’s 
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On The Picket Line 
The Motion Picture Screen Cartoonist Guild (SCG) still supported the CSU, but Sorrell 
had increased his sphere of influence in the motion picture industry by recruiting Story Analysts, 
Office Workers, and some of the unions who represented members of the press. Not that Sorrell 
or the CSU could compete with the conservative might of William Hearst’s publishing machine, 
but two of the three groups just mentioned could assist in crippling production at many of the 
major Hollywood studios. With the assistance of Jeff Kibre, another local labor leader, Sorrell 
had mustered up enough support to take the fight to the IATSE and hit its masters where it hurt 
the most: on the backlot of their motion picture studios. 
In March 1945, the IATSE became embroiled in a jurisdictional dispute over the Screen 
Decorators, who wanted to sign on with Sorrell and the CSU. In series of political cartoons 
entitled The Picket Line, scab laborers working for the IATSE were anthropomorphized as rats. 
Several of these drawings relied on racist iconography to convey their message. A few of these 
sketches, however, depicted something sinister at work at the gates of the Warner Brothers 
Studio in the mid-1940s. In a show of mob violence that cast a dark shadow over the whimsical 
Animator’s Strike of 1941, the CSU ordered picket lines to seize the means of production at the 
Warner Brothers Studio.  
The story of the 1945 Strike was viscerally expressed by illustrators working for the 
CSU’s propaganda machine, but this was not the IATSE that operated under the Browne and 
Bioff regime of the early-1940s—Sorrell and his friends in high places had seen to that. This was 
a new and improved IATSE. Richard Walsh had ascended to the union’s presidency in 1941 
while Bioff and Browne stared down the barrel of federal extortion charges. Walsh was 
supported by Roy Brewer, a cornfed leader for the AFL out in Nebraska, as his international 
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business representative for the IATSE. By Hollywood standards, Brewer was clean as a whistle. 
Walsh’s sordid history with Browne, however, was a matter of public record. While the Screen 
Publicist Guild and the Story Analysts were critical players in the Hollywood labor movement, 
the members of the SCG were still the “heart” of the CSU’s public relations campaigns.287 With 
Willie Bioff and George Browne out of the picture, the CSU felt they held “The Winning Hand” 
in Hollywood (see Figure 4.1 below).288 
  
 
Figure 4.1, “The Winning Hand!” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-7, Conference of Studio 
Unions, image used courtesy of University of California, Los Angeles. 
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As demonstrated during the Animator’s Strike, a few dedicated and talented artists could 
muster public attention rather quickly, and their wit could sting just as rapidly. As Hollywood’s 
militaristic left wing was steeling itself for war as Sorrell, the CSU, and other pro-labor 
organizations had become concerned with the ideological pendulum that was swinging to the 
right. Motion picture executives relied on the IATSE and scab labor to produce what they could 
while the CSU boycotts continued outside the gates of the major studios. The combined forces of 
the Cartoonists, Story Analysts, and Office Workers were the weapon of choice in the 




Figure 4.2, “The Pens are Mightier than the Sword!” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-47, 






Undoubtedly, illustrators for The Picket Line thought of themselves as clever. Figure 4.3 
below, however, demonstrated that some of their cartoons were incredibly racist and burdened 




Figure 4.3, “How About Some Two-Handed Pinochle?” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-47, 
Conference of Studio Unions, image used courtesy of University of California, Los Angeles. 
 
The artist’s deliberate choice to depict the NLRB and motion picture producers as 
cannibals—with dark black skin and oversized white lips—was questionable at best. The cartoon 
showed that the artists believed the laissez-faire attitude of film producers and the NLRB placed 
																																								 																				
290 “How About Some Two-Handed Pinochle?” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-7, HKSS, image used courtesy of 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
86 
the entire industry in a precarious position. The mustachioed white man, stewing in the pot, was 
an appropriate analog for the pressure building between the CSU and the IATSE in the motion 
picture industry. Hollywood’s labor movement had separate, but equal, spheres for its 
participants of color.  
Sorrell’s militant support of Hollywood’s underclass belied his relative disdain for Black 
Americans and other ethnic minorities—Italian laborers for example.291 Sorrell’s racism was 
casual, rather than overt. According to Horne, Sorrell once gave testimony before a 
congressional committee in which he described his financial status as “‘n———   rich’,” 
meaning he spent his earnings as quickly as he received them with little regard for his future.292 
More specific to his labor leadership, Sorrell happily trumpeted a story of African Americans 
joining in the Disney boycott during 1941. However, when Black office workers lobbied CSU 
executives, their pleas for increased representation fell on deaf ears. 
A copy of the I.A.T.S.E. Informational Bulletin, distributed on November 13, 1943, 
contained circumstantial evidence of Sorrell’s involvement with Hollywood organizations whose 
motivations were suspect. According to Brewer’s Bulletin, Sorrell had been present for a meeting 
of the Hollywood Peace Council that “constituted a violent attack on [President] Roosevelt and 
the ‘warmongers’.”293 Several other supporters of the CSU, including screen writer Dalton 
Trumbo, had attended the Council’s meeting. Brewer also noted that Sorrell had joined with 
Carey McWilliams and other delegates recruited by Ellis Patterson in 1940, in order to prevent 
Roosevelt’s election to his third term as President.294  While it cannot be confirmed, nor denied, 
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that Brewer personally suffered from “reefer madness,” the cartoon shown in Figure 4.4 below, 




Figure 4.4, “Does Your Marihuana [sic] Taste Different Lately?” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-
47, Conference of Studio Unions, image used courtesy of University of California, Los 
Angeles. 
 
While a concerned laborer looked up and asked an IATSE executive if his “marihuana 
[sic] tastes different lately,” the stand-in for Roy Brewer referenced a weekly screed being 
published and circulated by the IATSE. Among the most egregious offenses committed by 
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Sorrell, per Brewer’s Bulletin, was his attendance at a summer press conference, hosted by 
People’s World. According to a statement printed in the pro-labor newspaper, and contradictory 
to an early charge in the Bulletin, “…People’s World leads the…field in understanding the 
contributions of industry and labor in Hollywood to America’s war effort.”296 The statement was 
reportedly signed by screen writer John Howard Lawson and Herbert Sorrell, President of the 
CSU. The IATSE made sure to send a copy of this Bulletin to J. Parnell Thomas, Chairman of 
the House Un-American Activities Committee in January 1947.297  
For U.S. labor on the national level, a tenuous armistice had been brokered between Eric 
Johnston, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and national labor figureheads on April 
1, 1945. Johnston, William Green, President of the AFL, and Phillip Murray, President of the 
CIO, entered into an agreement called the Charter for Industrial Peace.298 The Hollywood Strike 
of 1945, which Sorrell ordered in March, was in violation of this no-strike agreement made by 
unions during World War II and violated the spirit of the Charter, which complimented federal 
opposition to the stoppage of wartime production. Neither Sorrell, IATSE leadership, nor studio 
executives had any way of predicting that the sustained firebombing campaigns carried out by 
the Allies or the U.S. decision to drop nuclear bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima would lead to 
the total surrender of the Japanese Empire. Be that as it may, the War’s dramatic conclusion 
brought the demand for wartime film and propaganda to a screeching halt. As the heat of the 
summer faded and the Hollywood Strike entered its seventh month, tensions flared at the Warner 
Brothers Studio.  
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On October 5, 1945, in a grisly scene that could only have been choreographed by the 
motion picture industry, Sorrell directed the CSU’s demonstrators towards a single mass picket 
operation at the Warner Brothers Studio. The opposition mobilized its own shock troopers in 
response. As stated by Larry Ceplair and Robert Englund, “the studio’s police and fire 
departments…and a vigilante squad of one thousand IATSE thugs…equipped with chains, 
rubber hoses, blackjacks and metal cables,” attempted to break the CSU’s lines.299 The event that 
came to be known as Hollywood’s Bloody Friday resulted in state-sanctioned violence against 




Figure 4.5, “Those Nazi Horror Pictures,” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-47, Conference of 
Studio Unions, image used courtesy of University of California, Los Angeles. 
																																								 																				
299 The private police and fire squads were armed with tear gas and firehoses respectively, see: Ceplair and Englund, 
The Inquisition in Hollywood, 220. 
300 “Those Nazi Horror Pictures,” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-7, Conference of Studio Unions, HKSS, image used 
courtesy of University of California, Los Angeles. 
90 
The CSU picketers became the victims of violence inflicted by heads of the Warner 
Brothers Studio—through their private police force—and state actors—through the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department.  The CSU was not alone in its jurisdictional conflict with the IATSE’s 
over the Set Decorators. Sorrell and Jeff Kibre repeated a strategy from the Animator’s Strike of 
1941. The two labor organizers had commanded a small army of longshoremen, bricks and 
chains in hand, to protect the protestors. Additionally, several members of the Screen Writers 
Guild—including Dalton Trumbo and John Howard Lawson—made a showing of solidarity and 
stood with the CSU. Even Aldous Huxley emerged from his hermitage to join his brethren at the 
Lockheed plant in lending their voices to the movement.301 Political cartoons were not the only 
violent representations of the strike. 
The photograph in Figure 4.6 above was taken by a member of the Los Angeles press.302 
Just out of view, to the top-right of the photograph, an audience surveyed the carnage below. 
According to Tom Sito, “[Jack] Warner and the studio’s senior management stood on the rooftop 
of a soundstage and supervised the action like generals,” but their appearance was cropped out 
by members of the press.303 The photograph also showed that several vehicles had been 
overturned and that employees of the studio had been instructed to turn fire hoses on the strikers. 
Several of the CSU strikers, including Herb Sorrell, were arrested by the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department for inciting the riot. The sheer volume of those arrested during the 
demonstrations resulted in mass trials, making a mockery of the local justice system. However, 
public opinion favored the CSU. 
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Figure 4.6, “Warner Brothers Strike,” October 1945-47, HSSC, image used courtesy of the 





Figure 4.7, “Nailed to the Double Cross,” The Picket Line, ca. 1945-47, Conference of 
Studio Unions, image used courtesy of University of California, Los Angeles. 
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One of the sketches in The Picket Line gave the bloodshed at the Warner Brothers Studio 
a religious subtext. “Nailed to the Double Cross” portrayed a feminized symbol of “democratic 
unionism,” crucified on the sigil of the Warner Brothers Studio (see Figure 4.7 above).304 
The figurative crucifixion signified the innocent self-perception held by the strikers allied with 
Sorrell and the CSU, but the “double cross” was also a play on words.  Demonstrators felt 
betrayed by studio executives and local law enforcement. The allusion to Warner Brothers’ 
actions as those of fascists was even more conspicuous. The CSU strikers were not Holocaust 
victims, yet their artists used hyperbole by depicting a swastika in the shadow of the mock 
crucifixion.305 A fire hose, which had been aimed at the lines of mass picketers, snaked its way 
around the grisly and sardonic model of “good citizenship.”306 Whatever sacrifices were made by 
Sorrell, the CSU, and their allies had been made in vain. Though the CSU won the day and was 
granted jurisdiction over the Set Decorators, many protestors had been arrested or badly injured, 
the strikes exhausted the organization’s resources, and most of all, Hollywood’s labor movement 
needed to return to work.  
 “Unity or Impotence” 
While Sorrell had hoped to unite the motion picture industry’s working class under the 
CSU banner of democratic unionism, politics in Los Angeles, the hired muscle, and local law 
enforcement all made resistance to the IATSE’s supremacy dangerous. At the end of the year, an 
introspective article in a circular, distributed by the film technician’s union, was published under 
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the headline: “Aftermath of the Strike – Unity of Impotency?”307 Russell McKnight, President of 
the Film Technicians of the Motion Picture Indusry, made a “plain statement” that highlighted 
the fact that there were “always elements…creating disunity in the ranks of labor…a few even 
sow the seeds of discord from within…inter-union fires.”308  
Right-wing organizations, like the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of 
American Ideals (MPA), had become a blight on democratic unionism and the Hollywood 
filmmaking industry. The strategies of Brewer, the IATSE, and the MPA were Machiavellian, in 
that they relied on “the telling of…a colossal lie and wanton use of the big lie as a political 
weapon.”309 According to an issue of Flashes, a periodical distributed by the Film Technicians’ 
union, groups like the MPA purported that they were the last line of defense against Communist 
incursion into U.S. filmmaking. This “last bulwark” had also taken to describing itself as “the 
‘white hope’ of Hollywood, as Germany styled itself the ‘white hope’ of Europe.”310 The 
publication also bemoaned that Brewer had forged an unholy alliance with other powerful 
conservatives like William Hearst, Westbrook Pegler, Jack Tenney, and John Rankin. 
Hollywood’s labor movement may not have been impotent, but the industry’s left wing faced an 
uphill battle against the forces of ideological conservatism. The wide reporting of Sorrell and 
various other Hollywood liberals’ exploits also assisted state and federal investigators in their 
laborious development of the labor leader’s file.  
In Sorrell’s HUAC file, federal investigators noted that, on November 8, 1945, the 
California State Legislature began its investigation into the Hollywood strike “to determine 
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whether a breakdown in law and order had occurred.”311 Such an obvious conclusion, however, 
did not necessitate the formation a state or federal committee. In March of 1947, Sorrell was the 
victim of kidnapping, when three unknown individuals forced him into a car, then beat and left 
the labor leader for dead over one hundred miles outside of Los Angeles. According to HUAC 
investigators, Variety reported that the response from left-leaning unions had been to wage a 
telegram campaign, directed at the Mayor of Los Angeles and federal legislators. The movement 
called for the “dismissal of charges against [CSU picketers] arrested during the [1945] Strike, 
termination” of continued inter-organizational violence, and protestation of the changes in 
federal labor law being brought forward by Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) and Congressman Fred 
Hartley, Jr. (R-NJ).312 The clamor among Hollywood’s labor movement remained loud, albeit 
ineffectual, but it could no longer be heard over the cacophony created by right-wing ideologues.  
While the CSU achieved several victories throughout the decade, at Disney’s studio and 
elsewhere in Hollywood, they never came to dominate the industry like the IATSE. Ultimately, 
the CSU’s left-wing campaign for democratic control of Hollywood labor was defeated by the 
crushing weight of federal legislation and a Congressional inquisition. According to Horne, the 
SCG, Office Workers, and Story Analysts wanted to return to work by 1946. Before the series of 
jurisdictional strikes ended in 1947, and against Sorrell’s wishes, the unions had done just that.313 
The Taft-Hartley legislation neutered labor’s power on the national level and within the motion 
picture industry. In late-February of 1948, a House Labor subcommittee used the Act to 
persecute Sorrell after some convincing from an IATSE attorney. According to an article in the 
Daily Worker, Chairman Gerald Landis (R-IN) “issued a ruling permitting hearsay,” against 
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Sorrell, “to the effect that ‘Communist influence’ was responsible for the dispute” between the 
CSU and IATSE.314 Sorrell was removed from the CSU’s executive leadership shortly before the 
organization dissolved. What independent unions remained at the end of the 1940s had no other 
choice but to fall in behind the AFL-backed IATSE. 
Between the 1930s and 1940s, in metaphorical terms, the Wagner Act had been a 
sledgehammer in the hands of the U.S. film industry’s working class. Though Sorrell and the 
CSU initially felt that they had the “winning hand,” both were forced to fold because the 
ideological deck was stacked against them.315 Hollywood’s labor movement had Virginia 
Congressman Howard Smith to thank for that, for he had opposed the NLRB from its inception. 
The Smith provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, which became the law of the land in 1947, and the 
HUAC were used as razor-sharp sickles to cut down resistance among Hollywood’s working-
class. According to James Gross, “fundamental changes came with the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act which itself was a legacy of the Smith Committee.”316 Union leaders were forced to 
affirm their patriotism, in writing, by signing affidavits swearing they were not affiliates or 
members of the Communist Party. Jurisdictional and sympathy strikes were outlawed as well. 
Moreover, these were just a few of the anti-labor measures of “the House bill that bears Hartley’s 
name was actually written in Smith’s office using Smith’s 1940 bill as a model.”317  
The relationships between Disney, other Hollywood elites, and government were official 
and reciprocal. State and federal investigations were launched because of personal vendettas. 
Beaten—literally—and broken—financially, Sorrell and the left-leaning unions like the Screen 
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Cartoonists Guild and the Office Workers may have won several Pyrrhic victories, at Disney’s 
studio in 1941 and Warner Brothers in the mid-1940s. The IATSE, however, ultimately won the 
war for Hollywood. Disney and other film producers wanted hegemony over all aspects of the 








This final chapter emphasizes the importance of the 1947 House Un-American Activities 
Committee proceedings, while elucidating the events in Chapter III from a different perspective. 
In part, this section demonstrates that Walt Disney’s testimony before Congress was heavily 
influenced by his interactions with Hollywood’s other right-wing ideologues, their co-dependent 
relationships with the federal government, and the longstanding grudges held between motion 
picture executives and industry labor activists like Herb Sorrell.  
The government’s case against the alleged Red Menace plaguing Hollywood propelled 
the ugliness of the industry’s labor-management conflicts into the national spotlight. Ultimately, 
the public was led to believe that the fate of the U.S. filmmaking industry, an American 
institution, was under attack by brainwashed artists and alleged Communist agents. In February 
of 1944, the Motion Picture Society for the Preservation of American Ideals (MPA) was formed 
to stand against the rising tide of perceived attacks on Americanism. All the while, U.S. 
government officials and investigative agencies launched and continued inquisitions into 
countless allegations of Communist activity. Like many other friendly witnesses, Walt Disney 
had little to offer the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Disney’s celebrity 
status and favorable relationship with the U.S. government granted credibility to his testimony. 
The subsequent testimony of Roy Brewer, an international representative for the IATSE, 
provided circumstantial, but damning, evidence of the suspected plot to usurp power in the 
motion picture industry. 
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Perverting a Powerful Medium 
Throughout the 1940s, Disney had clung to the firm belief that the motion picture 
industry, like his studio after the passage of the Wagner Act, had to be protected from subversive 
outside influence. Disney was not alone. By the mid-1940s, he had joined with several other 
right-wing ideologues to form the MPA. As noted by Ceplair and Englund, the MPA “was the 
brainchild of Hollywood anti-Rooseveltians,” primarily men like Sam Wood, a protégé of Cecil 
B. DeMille, and rabid anti-laborites such as Walt Disney.318 In early-February 1944, news of this 
alliance of anti-New Dealers reached major cities like Disney’s hometown of Chicago almost 
immediately. According to an article run in the Chicago Sunday Tribune, Wood announced that 
he had been elected president by the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American 
Ideals, who hated Communism but had no qualms about lengthy organizational titles.319 Walt 
Disney had assumed the role as First Vice President for the MPA, and Ayn Rand, a neo-liberal 
novelist, took on the duties of public relations for the Alliance. The Tribune article printed the 
MPA’s initial declaration which stated: “we refuse to permit the effort of communists, fascists, 
and other…groups to pervert the powerful medium [of film] into an instrument for the 
dissemination of un-American ideals and beliefs.”320  
On June 29, 1944, an article in The Hollywood Reporter demonstrated how various pro-
labor organizations were coming together to combat right-wingers like the MPA and its ilk. 
According to the article, the Council of Hollywood Guilds and Unions was created to safeguard 
																																								 																				
318 Ceplair and Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood, 209. 
319 As noted in Doherty’s work, the standard abbreviation used to describe this group was “more than a mouthful,” 
but so was its full name. To that end, the right-wing MPA, discussed presently, should not be confused with the 
Academy of Motion Picture of Arts and Sciences (AMPAS) or the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 
see: “Group Formed in Hollywood to Fight Reds,” Chicago Sunday Tribune, February 6, 1944, JFC; Doherty, Show 
Trial, 43.  
320 “Group Formed in Hollywood to Fight Reds.” 
99 
“more than half of Hollywood’s 30,000 workers.”321 The Council passed several resolutions 
condemning the MPA and praising the efforts of Sorrell and the CSU. Turnabout was fair play, 
as the Council branded the MPA “as ‘a subversive and dangerous organization’.”322 Several 
members of Hollywood’s liberal elite had turned out in support of the Council. Sorrell and 
Walter Wanger, an “unofficial guest,” spoke at the Council’s initial meeting.323 Others, like 
Orson Welles, pledged their support by telegram. The anti-labor sentiment among the 
membership of the MPA was strong. The MPA’s statement of purpose described the 
organization as a “rallying point for [those] who think like we do…who heretofore have been 
unheard and unnoticed in the din [created] by a small but highly organized, cleverly led, 
and…articulate minority.”324 Arguably, the MPA was one of the most overtly conservative 
groups formed in the filmmaking industry since the founding of the Motion Picture Association 
of America, which established and enforced censorship guidelines for Hollywood since 1930. 
Though nearly everyone involved in making motion pictures in the mid to late-1940s asserted 
their patriotism whenever they could, screen writers were unsettled by the right-wing nationalism 
expressed by groups like the MPA.  
In November 1944, Elmer Rice, a New York playwright, strongly voiced his concerns 
about the MPA in an editorial for The Saturday Review.325 Rice characterized the MPA’s 
motivations as sinister. “One need not look far below the surface,” Rice wrote, “to discover that 
the [MPA] and its leading spirits are deeply tinged with isolationism and anti-unionism 
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and…with strong overtones of anti-Semitism and Jim Crowism.”326 Rice’s claim was biting 
because it was true. Several motion picture industry leaders, Disney included, had been vocal 
about their disdain for union activity. Disney’s idolization of Henry Ford may have informed 
Rice’s accusation of anti-Semitism.327 However, insensitivity to race and ethnicity were not 
mutually exclusive to either pole of Hollywood’s ideological spectrum. While Rice’s charge that 
Walt Disney was a closeted anti-Semite was circumstantial, at best, his other criticisms had teeth. 
Disney’s racially-tone deaf proclivities were screened in theaters, nationwide. 
Though Disney’s Song of the South (1946) made its public debut a few years after Rice’s 
criticism appeared in The Saturday Review, it was mired in race-based controversy. In order to 
assuage criticism of the film before it was released, Disney deliberately hired Maurice Rapf. 
“Mainly known for his work on…’youth’ films,” Rapf adapted the original script for Disney’s 
Song of the South.328 In hiring Rapf as a writer, Disney believed he was getting an ideological 
bargain. According to M. Thomas Inge, Rapf “seemed to have the appropriate liberal credentials 
to guarantee a noncontroversial treatment” for the script in that he was Jewish and sensitive to 
issues dealing with discrimination.329 Rapf warned Disney that his casting choices might 
perpetuate derogatory stereotypes. Uncle Remus, the film’s main character, was played by James 
Baskett, and Disney cast Hattie McDaniel, who starred in Gone with the Wind (1940), to reprise 
her role as an African American woman relegated to the sphere of domestic labor. In response to 
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Rapf’s concerns, Disney simply played dumb and replied, “That’s why I want someone like you 
to work on it…Most of us—even if we have no racial bias—commit boo-boos that offend people 
all the time.”330  
Additionally, Rapf conceded that “Bad-mouthing Disney” was “something of a popular 
sport.”331 Rice’s charge of anti-Semitism was bombastic, but Rapf offered an opinion to the 
contrary. The writer had his doubts that Walt Disney harbored any ill will towards Jews. As Rapf 
explained further, “Disney was a dyed-in-the-wool Republican, [but] he may even have known 
that I was a Communist…he certainly knew I was Jewish.”332 Disney’s intent in hiring Rapf 
made little difference at any rate. All of Rapf’s racially-sensitive labor was disregarded when the 
final revisions to the script were handed off another writer. According to Inge, Morton Grant, 
“who was neither Southern nor liberal…and mainly worked on inexpensive western films for 
Warner Brothers,” got the last word in on Song of the South.333  
In choosing to debut the film in Atlanta, Georgia, Disney merely poured salt in the 
festering wound of U.S. race relations. Regardless of how loudly or joyfully Uncle Remus 
whistled, November 27, 1946—opening day for Disney’s Song of the South—was not a 
wonderful day for African Americans. When Song of the South debuted in U.S. theaters, Walter 
White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People condemned it for 
“perpetuating a dangerously glorified picture of slavery.”334 Shown in vibrant Technicolor, Song 
of the South was a feature-length production that blended live action with animated 
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interpretations of African American folklore. Picket lines and demonstrations were held by the 
National Negro Congress in several major cities nationwide. As Inge also noted, Atlanta, 
specifically, was reeling from the recent lynching of a Black family.335 In accordance with Jim 
Crow laws, the theater chosen by Disney for the film’s premier followed strict guidelines for 
race-based segregation in public spaces. Song of the South’s two African American stars, Baskett 
and McDaniel, as well as other Black attendees, had to use the back entrance and were forced to 
view the film’s premier from the theater’s segregated balcony. 
Returning to Rice’s criticism of the MPA, he also recognized the imperial power wielded 
by Hollywood’s elite. Rice appropriately declared, “the motion picture…is today…the most 
potent medium in existence for coloring the emotions and shaping the attitudes of the world’s 
population.”336 Ideological hope was not lost among the film industry’s working class. 
Progressives still resisted the MPA’s attempts to control Hollywood. According to Rice, Walter 
Wanger and Herb Sorrell were representative of the “fine militant spirit…among Hollywood 
workers” which stood in opposition to the MPA’s America First tendencies.337 The writer offered 
readers of The Saturday Review commentary made during a meeting held by opponents of the 
MPA. “When a fellow wraps himself in the American flag,” the anonymous labor leader 
quipped, “it’s usually because he’s afraid of being caught with his pants down.”338 Rice believed 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression was being threatened by groups like the MPA. 
By the latter-half of the 1940s, both side of the conflict were closing ranks. 
																																								 																				
335 Inge, “Walt Disney’s Song of the South and the Politics of Animation,” 223. 
336 Rice, “The M.P.A. and American Ideals,” 18. Emphasis added. 
337 Rice, “The M.P.A. and American Ideals,” 18. 
338 Although Rice did not attribute the quote directly to Sorrell, it was witty enough to infer that it was the leader of 
the CSU who made the statement, see: Rice, “The M.P.A. and American Ideals,” 18. 
103 
In 1947, in an op-ed published during his tenure as editor for The Washington Star, 
Lowell Mellett, former head of the OWI’s Bureau of Motion Pictures, indicated that a “three-ring 
circus” was on its way to Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. 339 This second iteration of the House 
Un-American Activities, originally chaired by Martin Dies, would be led by Congressman J. 
Parnell Thomas, a Republican from New Jersey. Most of the background information for the 
1947 HUAC had been collected and synthesized by H.A. Smith and a team of federal 
investigators. However, Robert E. Stripling, who offered his services voluntarily when the Dies 
Committee ran out of funding, remained on as the Committee’s Chief Investigator. To the left of 
Chairman Thomas sat Richard Nixon, a Republican Congressman from California.  
According to Mellett, the HUAC and its investigators had “subpoenaed the Barnums, 
Baileys, and Ringling Brothers of the picture world,” but discussing Hollywood’s labor 
movement presented an arduous task.340 Even though he was a former official of the OWI, 
Mellett became caught up in the Hollywood inquisition. An accusation had been circulating 
through the press that the former Roosevelt appointee had coerced actor, Robert Taylor, into 
appearing, “against his will,” in Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer’s Song of Russia (1944).341 In a letter to 
Chairman Thomas, dated June 5, 1947, Mellett rejected the allegation and the HUAC’s taking up 
of the issue. Mellett advised Thomas that he “wish[ed] to protest this hit-and-run or smear-and-
run action.”342 He concluded with a demand to defend himself before the HUAC as soon as 
possible, but such a spectacle would be delayed until Autumn of 1947. 
																																								 																				
339 Lowell Mellett, “Three Rings in the Coming Circus and the Ring to Watch is the Third,” The Washington Star, 
October 14, 1947, Mellett, Lowell – Investigative File, RG233. 
340 Mellett, “Three Rings in the Coming Circus.” 
341 Lowell Mellett, Letter to Hon. J. Parnell Thomas, Chairman, House Un-American Activities Committee, June 5, 
1947, Mellett, Lowell – Investigative File, RG233. 
342 Mellett, Letter to Hon. J. Parnell Thomas. 
104 
The Committee’s choice in witnesses showed that the HUAC’s attempts to prove the 
existence of a significant Communist presence in Hollywood were calculated. Ronald Reagan, a 
young, attractive actor and future President of the United States, answered the congressional call. 
Reagan had been described by one of his peers as a “reformed Leftist,” and he still considered 
himself a “New Deal Liberal.”343 Furthermore, he supported the rights of employees in the 
motion picture industry to organize themselves democratically. Reagan had served on the Board 
of Directors for the Screen Actors’ Guild. He had also been elected as union president many 
years before. This posed an ideological difficulty for the HUAC.  
Summoning Regan before the dais allowed the HUAC to present their questioning as fair 
and balanced, but the inquisitors had to tread lightly. According to H.A. Smith, if the questioning 
became too personal, Reagan was likely to callout “professional Red-baiters” by name.344 As 
suggested by Smith’s witness report, Reagan was fearless, and otherwise “a nice talker, [and] 
well informed.”345 Reagan turned out to be one of the more level-headed witnesses called before 
the HUAC. Through his testimony, Reagan revealed that he had personal experience with the 
ongoing conflict between the CSU and the IATSE. As Reagan explained to Stripling, the Screen 
Actors Guild had tried to broker a deal between the producers and “both factions in the 
jurisdictional dispute.”346 Reagan recalled that the first time he heard of Communist involvement 
in the quarrel was at a meeting with leadership of the Carpenters’ union, held in Chicago. 
According to Reagan, William Hutchinson, the union’s president, offered to assist in running 
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“Sorrell and the other Commies out,” if Richard Walsh would agree to settle the strike.347 When 
it came time for Reagan to discuss the Communist Party directly with the HUAC, the actor was 
reticent to vilify anyone personally. Reagan did “not believe that Communists have ever...been 
able to use the motion-picture industry as a sounding board for their…ideology.”348 Although 
Reagan could provide no evidence to further the HUAC’s case that Communists had been 
running amuck in Hollywood, he confessed that he did fear that the Party’s existence in the U.S. 
threatened the ideal of a Jeffersonian republic. Calling Hollywood artists, like Reagan, to testify 
presented a gamble for the HUAC, but the payoff differed dramatically when they summoned 
artists suspected of Communist affiliations. 
 The testimonies of John Howard Lawson, Dalton Trumbo, and Alvah Bessie—all part of 
the “Hollywood Ten” who were sentenced to one year in prison for their refusal to comply with 
the Committee’s investigations—demonstrated how un-democratic the HUAC proceedings 
were.349 Calling Lawson before the dais quickly descended into a sideshow of American 
ideology. Lawson informed Stripling and the HUAC that they had no authority to interrogate 
him as they planned. While Stripling tried to gavel him down, Lawson argued that “the raising of 
any question here in regard to membership...political beliefs” was beyond the Committee’s 
constitutional authority.350 To confirm his membership in the Screen Writers Guild, Lawson 
indicated to the HUAC, any member of congress, or U.S. citizen for that matter could consult the 
public record. The gallery broke into applause, but Chairman Thomas quickly silenced them.  
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Later, Lawson thanked the Chairman for making “it perfectly clear that [Thomas was] 
going to threaten and intimidate” other HUAC witnesses.351 When Stripling attempted to review 
Lawson’s body of work, the screen writer refused to confirm or deny any of his efforts. 
According to Lawson, he would have to answer questions “outside of the province of this 
committee.”352 By the time the HUAC’s questioning turned to the writer’s affiliation with the 
Communist Party, the Chairman was infuriated.  Lawson, too, seemed to have had enough. To a 
mixture of “applause and boos,” which were gaveled down by Chairman Thomas, Lawson was 
ejected from the inquiry by force.353  
Dalton Trumbo’s oratory before the HUAC was equally eventful. Chairman Thomas 
repeatedly shouted down Trumbo’s efforts to have a written statement entered into the 
Congressional Record.354 Stripling began by attempting to instruct Trumbo on how to answer the 
Committee’s questioning. According to Stripling, “all of…the various questions can be answered 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’,” but Trumbo argued that “very many questions” could only be answered in such a 
manner “by a moron or a slave.”355 Furthermore, Trumbo attempted to direct the public’s 
attention to the HUAC’s anti-labor voting record. All of the Committee’s members, he noted, 
“voted in favor of the Taft-Hartley bill…and might be considered…hostile to labor.”356 When 
Chairman Thomas asked Trumbo to publicly confirm his membership in the Communist Party, 
the writer demanded evidence supporting such a charge. Trumbo’s request was met with laughter 
and applause from the gallery, as Chairman Thomas dismissed him from the stand for refusing to 
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answer. While being forcibly removed from Congressional chambers, Trumbo cried out: “This is 
the beginning, [Thomas gaveled], of an American concentration camp.”357 After the Chairman 
restored order to the proceedings, he requested that the rest of the HUAC’s evidence against 
Trumbo be presented. 
 Like Lawson and Trumbo, Alvah Bessie’s testimony was an extremely brief spectacle. 
The HUAC allowed Bessie to enter a written statement into the record, although Chairman 
Thomas expressed “some doubt that [it would be] pertinent to the inquiry.”358 In his statement, 
Bessie attempted to defend his First Amendment rights, which he felt the HUAC was trampling 
on. Bessie’s “experience” showed him that the present proceedings were “precisely…identical” 
to those held “by un-Spanish…un-German…and un-Italian committees” before those respective 
nations “succumbed to fascism.”359 When Stripling asked the “$64 dollar question,” pertaining to 
Bessie’s membership in the Communist Party, the writer invoked his right to remain silent as a 
U.S. war hero had once done.360 “General Eisenhower refused to reveal his political affiliations,” 
Bessie explained, then he offered to have the “secretary read it back” if anyone on the dais had 
misunderstood. While asking Bessie to be removed from chambers, the Chairman suggested that 
if the writer desired “to make a big speech,” then he could do so outside, “under a big tree.”361 
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The Americanist Manifesto and a Distressed Soviet Damsel  
There were writers for the stage and screen more sympathetic to the HUAC’s cause. 
Morrie Ryskind, for example, was a founding member of the MPA and captured investigators’ 
attention when he responded to Rice’s assault on the integrity of the Alliance. Ryskind’s reply to 
Rice appeared in an issue of The New Leader, published in January 1945.362 While Ryksind had 
previously considered himself a Socialist in the 1930s, he later withdrew his support from 
Roosevelt in 1940 and subsequently became a hardline conservative. Ryskind justified his own 
membership in the MPA by comparing its goals to the Committee for Cultural Freedom. 
According to Ryskind the MPA and the Committee were “formed…‘to combat the rising tide of 
totalitarianism…through subsidized propaganda, through energetic agents, through political 
pressure, the totalitarian states succeeded in infecting other countries’.”363 However, this did not 
stop him from reminding his readers that Disney had fought the good fight, against subversive 
labor types, at his studio in 1941. Evidently lost on Ryskind were the U.S. government’s own 
subsidies which funded Good Neighbor diplomacy and promoted the war effort—to say nothing 
about Disney’s happily lapping up those subsidies. Ryskind was a playwright, not a story 
analyst. 
When Ryskind was summoned before the HUAC, he provided more ambiguous claims. 
Ryskind insisted to Chief Investigator Smith that one “would have to be deaf, dumb, and blind 
not to observe those activities,” yet he provided no physical evidence that Communists had 
successfully infiltrated the motion picture industry, much less taken it over.364 The Communist 
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Party, according to Ryskind, attacked Hollywood from two angles. First, were the “general 
commie fronts for suckers,” and second were their efforts to overrun the industry’s labor 
movement.365 He also admitted that his spouse had been one of those suckers. As Ryskind 
informed the HUAC, his wife had “joined this League Against War and Fascism,” but she 
resigned several weeks after joining because they seemed “interested in civil liberties, but only 
for Communists.”366 Ryskind also accused the Daily Worker of absconding with funds raised to 
defend the Scottsboro Boys—the nine African American teenagers who were being railroaded in 
Alabama by false accusations that they raped several white women. Ryksind offered no proof to 
support such a claim, but then again, most of the MPA members based their conclusions on 
hearsay and paranoid conjecture. It was par for the course.  
Another friend of the MPA and witness for the HUAC, Ayn Rand, was described by 
investigators as a “Russian Jewess” and author of The Fountainhead, a novel based on her 
interpretation of neo-liberal fantasy.367 The HUAC was extremely interested in her first-hand 
account from Soviet Russia, but their gendered expectations gave them momentary pause in 
calling her to publicly testify. 368 Rand’s speaking voice and her appearance could have made her 
testimony problematic. According to the Smith Report, it was “a little difficult to understand” 
Rand when she spoke, and “her appearance [was] slightly detrimental in that she [had] a semi-
mannish haircut.”369 Rand was the guilty party behind the MPA’s ruthless word count, but she 
was not of much use at public speaking engagements. The HUAC felt they could extrapolate a 
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parade of Soviet horrors from Rand’s personal experiences, her Russian accent and short hair 
notwithstanding. 
Rand also penned the Screen Guide for Americans on behalf of the MPA.370 The Screen 
Guide was more of an imposition of right-wing, ideological prescriptions than a list of ways to 
improve upon U.S. filmmaking. Rand’s Screen Guide demanded that American films not “smear 
the free enterprise system…[because] Americanism and the Free Enterprise System…are 
inseparable, like body and soul.”371 According to Rand, there was nothing honorable about 
public institutions or charitable organizations. More importantly, Rand insisted that U.S. 
filmmakers not “smear industrialists.”372 This suggestion would have protected industry leaders 
like Disney and Henry Ford. Rand had seen “a constant stream of such pictures as pernicious 
political propaganda,” in that they generated “hatred for all businessmen…and [made] people 
receptive to the cause of Communism.”373 “It is a basic tenet of Marxism,” Rand continued, “that 
man…is only a soulless, witless collection of meat and glands.”374 Inadvertently, Rand had just 
described Donald Duck. Rand’s conclusion for the Screen Guide was full of outright falsehoods, 
especially in light of the strikes that plagued Hollywood from 1945 to 1947. Rand argued, “We 
do not use police force to forbid the expression of Communist…ideas—which means that we do 
not pass laws forbidding Communists to speak.”375 Yet, that is precisely what Chairman Thomas 
did by having Lawson, Trumbo, and Bessie ejected from the HUAC hearings—if they were 
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actually Communists. Despite the reservations held by investigators concerning Rand’s outward 
appearance, she possessed right-wing credentials.  
According to HUAC investigators, Rand’s direct encounters with Communism in 
Hollywood’s motion picture industry were scarce to say the least. She had emigrated to the U.S. 
after surviving the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, then Warner Brothers optioned The 
Fountainhead in order to produce a film adaption. Rand’s services as a screen writer, however, 
were turned away by producers at Paramount Pictures. As investigators noted, “they were not 
interested in making pro-capitalist pictures.”376 It was Rand’s working relationship with the 
MPA that made her a person of interest for HUAC investigators.  
The HUAC inquired about Rand’s interpretation of what might become of Hollywood, 
and thus the U.S., as a result of Communist influence. Stripling asked her to compare what she 
had seen in Russia to the alleged conspiracy in Hollywood. Rand responded with what has been 
described by Thomas Doherty as an “appalled exegesis of MGM’s Song of Russia.”377 In the 
film, Robert Taylor played an American conductor. Rand explained that she became disgusted 
when Taylor “starts playing the American national anthem…[which] dissolves into a Russian 
mob, with the sickle and hammer on a red flag…above their heads.”378 After members of the dais 
reviewed the recent historical justifications for the U.S. alliance with Russia, Rand concluded her 
testimony by explicating what it was like to live through the Bolshevik Revolution. “It is almost 
impossible to convey to a free people what it is like to live in a totalitarian dictatorship,” Rand 
explained, “try to imagine what it is like if you are in constant terror…afraid of anything and 
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everybody.”379 Fear was the emotion fueling the MPA’s propaganda and the HUAC 
investigation. 
Mr. Disney’s Flying Circus 
Jack Warner was the fourth person with knowledge of the alleged Communist plot to be 
called by the HUAC once they had commenced their October proceedings. The Committee 
appeared disinterested in having Jack Warner restate his account of the recent labor troubles at 
he and his brother’s studio. No member of the dais asked Warner to recount the days he ordered 
his private police and fire squad to unleash tear gas and hoses on CSU strikers. It would not have 
been good showmanship on the part of the HUAC. They did, however, enter into the record and 
reaffirm much of the testimony Warner had given to Los Angeles Assemblyman Jack Tenney’s 
smaller HUAC on May 15, 1947. The true nature of their inquiry related to uncovering evidence 
that several recently released films, Warner Brothers Studio’s Mission to Moscow (1943) for 
example, allegedly conveyed messages planted by Communist actors. In his opening statement, 
Warner pointed out that “many charges, including the fantasy of ‘White House pressure’ have 
been leveled at our wartime production Mission to Moscow.”380 Warner defended his studio’s 
involvement in the film, and suggested that there were more pressing matters to discuss. 
“Ideological termites,” Warner explained, “have burrowed into many American industries, 
organizations and societies.”381  
Eager to prove himself, Congressman Nixon was curious about how U.S. films might be 
used to shape ideology abroad. Nixon opened his questioning of Warner by repeating that 
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“dictatorships could not be fought by borrowing dictatorial methods.”382 Nixon was quickly 
making his way toward defending the HUAC’s investigations by comparing the methods of 
subversive agents to those employed by fascist nations, such as Germany. Warner admitted that 
he was no foreign policy wonk, but he believed “there were not any movies shown” in Europe, 
aside from those depicting “the destruction of man by the Nazis.”383 When Nixon pivoted to the 
Russian press, Warner could only rely on information he had gleaned from American 
newspapers. To Nixon’s delight, Warner also provided a long list of films— “43 of 100”—
produced by his studio, since the First World War, that vilified “Fascist Germany.”384 Nixon 
professed his fondness for the pro-American pictures produced at the Warner Brothers Studio. 
He described such films as “selling America,” in that they highlighted “the benefits of our 
American system and…describe the freedoms which we have here.”385 Warner, in turn, offered 
to saturate Russian movie theatres with feature-length films and short subjects advertising 
American virtue. Nixon agreed that “it was essential…to attack the Communist and Fascist way 
of life with a free press and free screen.”386 Warner concluded by committing to the dais that he 
and his executives would “act very effectively” if they were provided “supporting proof” of any 
malfeasance at the Warner Brothers Studio.387 Studio heads like Walt Disney were more 
proactive in their approach. 
According to a memorandum penned by H.A. Smith in early-September 1947, he and 
other investigators “experienced some difficulty…in convincing [Disney] that his testimony 
																																								 																				
382 “Testimony of Warner,” Hearings, 11 and 20. 
383 “Testimony of Warner,” Hearings, 20. 
384 “Testimony of Warner,” Hearings, 21-6. 
385 “Testimony of Warner,” Hearings, 28. 
386 “Testimony of Warner,” Hearings, 29. 
387 “Testimony of Warner,” Hearings, 54. 
114 
would be of value.”388 Smith disagreed and expressed his confidence that Disney would make a 
compelling witness. The investigator added that he and his team felt “that in view of the type of 
picture which he makes…[Disney’s] statement opposing Communism would be of material 
value so far as the younger generation is concerned.”389 According to the HUAC’s investigation, 
Disney referred to Mellett, who had consulted with WDP during its production of government-
sponsored propaganda, as a “rabid New Dealer.”390 Furthermore, Disney accused Mellett’s 
assistant, who was given significant freedom while working at WDP, of subversive activities.  
Disney alleged that the assistant was “attempting to spread propaganda, whereupon his activities 
were closely watched.”391 Disney related to investigators that his suspicions were reported 
through proper government channels. At the same time, Disney was “attempting to get into…16-
mm educational films, which he strongly believes must be kept clean of propaganda because 
they will go directly to the schools and will help mold future Americans.”392  
As far as Disney’s labor-management issues were concerned, Smith reported that, per 
Disney, “Sorrell stated he would not have an election [and] that he used the NLRB or those 
government agencies only when they served his purpose.”393 The memorandum also conveyed 
that the Animator’s Strike of 1941 had a noticeable impact on WDP’s manpower. As of 
September 1947, “Disney [had] approximately 700 workers,” which was a reduction in WDP’s 
																																								 																				
388 H.A. Smith, Memorandum re: Walt Disney, September 8, 1947, 1, Disney, Walt – Witness File, RG233. 
389 Smith, “re: Walt Disney,” 1. 
390 Smith, “re: Walt Disney,” 2. 
391 Smith, “re: Walt Disney,” 2. 
392 Smith, “re: Walt Disney,” 1. 
393 Smith, “re: Walt Disney,” 1. 
115 
labor pool totaling “around 1,000” when his artists went on strike.394 Labor took center stage by 
the time they called Disney to testify.  
On October 27, 1947, at Chairman Thomas’ direction, Disney was interrogated by H.A. 
Smith, who began by lobbing softball questions in the witness’s direction. One line of inquiry 
related to WDP’s global distribution of its animated shorts and features: 
Mr. Smith: Where are these films distributed? 
Mr. Disney: All over the world. 
Mr. Smith: In all countries of the world? 
Mr. Disney: Well, except the Russian countries. 
Mr. Smith: Why aren’t they distributed in Russia, Mr. Disney? 
Mr. Disney: Well, we can’t do business with them. 
Mr. Smith: What do you mean by that?395 
 
Disney’s answer to Smith’s last question was an ideologically-driven oversimplification. “They 
looked at a lot of our pictures,” Disney replied, “but then turned them back to us and said they 
didn’t want them, they didn’t suit their purposes.”396  
When the conversation turned to the propaganda produced at Disney’s studio, Walt’s 
replies became muddled and contradictory. Smith asked, “Have you ever made any pictures in 
your studio that contained propaganda?”397 Disney was forced to concede that they did, but he 
used war as a justification. He also touted his studio’s work for the federal government and 
Victory through Air Power, a film he took a great deal of person pride in creating. Smith 
followed up with a similar question. Changing the tense of his verbiage, Smith inquired, “Do you 
permit pictures to be made at your studio containing propaganda?”398 This time, Disney offered a 
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denial. “We never have,” Disney firmly asserted then added that “we watch so that nothing gets 
into the films that would be harmful in any way to any group or any country.”399 Disney claimed 
that he and his executives had exhaustively labored to keep offending material out of the studio’s 
productions. WDP’s Song of the South, however, demonstrated how little Disney understood 
about the “limitless possibilities of the medium,” or committing racist “boo-boos.”400 
The next topic brought up by the HUAC dealt directly with the labor-management 
dispute during the Animator’s Strike of 1941. According to Disney, the entirety of the SCG’s 
legitimate dispute was based on an elaborate scheme, concocted by Herb Sorrell and Communist 
front organizations. Disney vehemently denied that his studio had experienced “a labor problem 
at all.”401 He felt that the pro-labor press—including People’s World, the Daily Worker, and PM 
Magazine—had engaged in a campaign to besmirch the reputation of his cartoon factory. “I even 
went through the same smear in South America,” Disney said while adding, “…they called my 
plant a sweat-shop.”402 At this point, Chairman Thomas interjected with a question of his own 
regarding Disney’s relationship with Sorrell and the SCG. “Supposing you had given in to him,” 
Thomas asked, “then what would have been the outcome?”403 Disney seized the opportunity to 
grandstand. “I would never have given in to him,” replied Disney, “because it was a matter of 
principle with me, and I fight for principles.”404 As the HUAC’s questioning continued, Disney 
continued to harp on Sorrell and the artists who organized the SCG’s Disney unit.  
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Disney claimed that Sorrell had professed his ties to Communism during a private 
meeting. Allegedly, Sorrell once asked Disney, “You think I am a Communist, don’t you,” then 
the labor leader proceeded to gloat about receiving funding from the Communists in 1937.405 
Whereas Sorrell valued the confidentiality of his associates, Walt Disney was fine with accusing 
his unionizing artists of allegedly exhibiting subversive behaviors. He was extremely careful not 
to mention Art Babbitt by name. According to Disney, David Hilberman, “the real brains of 
this…had no religion and…had spent considerable time at Moscow Art Theatre studying art 
direction, or something.”406 However, Disney failed to mention Bill Tytla—a prized Ukrainian 
animator and personal friend of Babbitt’s—in the plot to overthrow leadership at his cartoon 
operation. According to John Canemaker, Tytla had once entertained the idea for creating a 
Disney-like studio in Moscow while traveling in Europe with several other artists.407 Tytla had 
struck with the other animators in 1941 but only out of loyalty to his cartoonist comrades. 
As Disney’s testimony began to wind down, Smith solicited his opinion on the 
Communist Party. Disney happily obliged and stated that he “believe[d] it [was] an un-American 
thing…”408 Furthermore, he resented Communists for their ability to infiltrate labor unions, and 
he felt that the ideologies of his employees had been misrepresented to the world. “We must 
keep the American labor unions clean,” Disney continued, “We have got to fight for them.”409 
Chairman Thomas concluded the HUAC’s questioning of Disney on a laudatory note. While 
thanking Disney for his public service, Thomas expressed that Walt “as a creator of 
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entertainment [was] probably one of the greatest examples in the profession.”410 As the 
Chairman dismissed the witness, he thanked Disney for his national service. Following Disney’s 
testimony, the HUAC adjourned for the day. On the whole, Disney’s testimony provided 
justifications for his anti-union activities. Leadership for the IATSE would later reinforce 
Disney’s alarmist stance. 
After adjourning for the weekend, the HUAC reconvened on October 30, 1947. Roy 
Brewer was called before the HUAC as a representative for the IATSE. While Brewer was not 
the culprit behind the numerous schemes and plots that marred the IATSE’s reputation, he was 
appointed to its leadership in 1945, during the organization’s jurisdictional dispute with the CSU. 
Brewer touted his government service and his time as president of the AFL’s state affiliate in 
Nebraska to members of the HUAC.411 After that brief introduction, Brewer claimed that the 
CSU’s purpose in Hollywood was illegitimate and a front for radicalism. Although the CSU 
claimed affiliation with the AFL, Brewer claimed Sorrell’s organization played an essential 
purpose in the Communist Party’s “definite attempt…to take over the entire structure of the 
[Hollywood] trade-union movement.”412 Stripling then asked Brewer to identify the persons 
behind the alleged Communist takeover of the motion picture industry. Brewer replied by 
suggesting that Sorrell had been assigned to fulfill the Communist Party’s directives after Jeff 
Kibre, another alleged agent provocateur, had moved on to disrupting other industrial settings on 
the west coast. Brewer alleged that Kibre was a busy man, instigating California’s North 
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American Aviation Strike, becoming an official for the CIO’s fishermen’s union, and being 
“indicted and convicted…for violating anti-trust law.”413  
As for the part played by Sorrell specifically, Brewer’s alleged that the organizer was one 
of two key figures in the Communist plot. According to Brewer, Sorrell was attempting to 
“infiltrate and control…technical labor,” while John Howard Lawson was doing the same in 
“talent guilds and so-called cultural groups.”414 The accusation by Brewer may have had dire 
implications, but it was hardly a revelation. As noted by Doherty, J. Edgar Hoover had warned of 
this two-pronged approach before the HUAC in March 1947. At that time, Hoover testified that 
American Communists were directed by Moscow to commence “a ‘furtive drive on 
Hollywood…to infiltrate the labor unions and to infiltrate the so-called intellectual and creative 
fields’.”415  
The second half of Brewer’s HUAC testimony was briefly interrupted by a telegram, 
transmitted by Leo “The Cisco Kid” Carrillo. Carrillo was a Hollywood performer, whose 
Spanish family tree had deep roots in local and state politics in California. In 1944, Carrillo had 
also performed in a quasi-Mexican minstrel show, for a Republican fundraiser, emceed by Cecile 
B. DeMille, organized by R.K.O. Pictures head of production David Selznick, and featuring a 
speech by Walt Disney. The Mexican-American actor lauded the efforts and courage of the 
HUAC investigators, and his telegram was entered into the Congressional Record. According to 
his urgent message from the western front in Hollywood, “Communist rattlesnakes are bent on 
inoculating the mind of our American youth.”416 Nevertheless, Carrillo assured members of the 
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HUAC that they were “not injuring our industry” through their interrogations, they were 
“helping to keep…out the rats.”417  
Carrillo’s message was delivered to the HUAC just before Chairman Thomas cited Alvah 
Bessie and another writer for contempt, then Brewer’s testimony resumed for a short time. As 
Thomas explained to Brewer, the HUAC had “a heavy schedule of witnesses…and were getting 
further behind.”418 In closing, Brewer complained that he had been the victim of litigation funded 
by the Communist Party. Brewer and Congressman John McDowell (R-PA) joked back and forth 
about how much they had been sued for. Brewer had been sued for “$150,000,” whereas 
McDowell had been sued for “$100,000,” but Chairman Thomas shut down their libel suit 
measuring contest by stating that he did not “think [either] was pertinent” to the present 
hearings.419 
The scenes acted out before the HUAC in October 1947 were reminiscent of several of 
the animated sequences featured in Dumbo (1941), which was produced and released during the 
Animator’s Strike of 1941.420 Briefly, Dumbo was the tale of an elephant calf, named Jumbo Jr., 
who was ridiculed by fellow members of his “proud race” for a phenotypical difference, his 
oversized ears.421 In one problematic scene, Jumbo and his companion, Timothy Mouse—no 
relation to Mickey—passed out from an accidental, all-night bender. Although the sequence 
depicted underage drinking, it was a technical masterpiece. As Jumbo and Timothy awoke from 
their drunken stupors, somewhere in the American South, the two were greeted by a quintet of 
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harmonious blackbirds. The murder of anthropomorphized Jim Crows serenaded Jumbo and 
Timothy with skepticism over the pachyderm’s ability to fly.422  Though the animated minstrel 
show deserved criticism, the means by which the juvenile elephant and his mouse companion 
came to get lost in the sauce were far more disconcerting.  
In 1941, Disney was Hollywood’s ring master. Although Bill “Vladimir” Tytla and Art 
Babbitt were identified as Animation Designers in Dumbo’s opening credits, the Animator’s 
Strike threatened the film’s production.423 Before Jumbo and Timothy gained access to liquor, 
the circus clowns had been imbibing and organizing for the purpose of collective bargaining with 
the ring master.424 The protagonists in Dumbo nearly lost their minds because of the carelessness 
of the working-class. The newly-unionized troop of clowns carelessly disposed of their leftover 
alcohol by tossing it in their camp’s potable drinking water. They were headed to “hit the big 
boss up for a raise,” and they gleefully sang that they “going to get more money” on their way to 
assert their federal right to collective bargaining.425  
The ringmaster of the “Three Ring Circus” on Capitol Hill, as Lowell Mellett described 
the HUAC hearings, was Chairman J. Parnell Thomas.426 Six years earlier, Disney executives 
received a different warning, directly from Mellett. There were fewer things more insulting to 
industrial workers, Mellett cautioned, than being “made the butt of a joke by a superior.”427  
Disney and the artists animating Dumbo must not have read the memo. The film’s climatic 
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strange trip. In their act, the circus clowns made fools of themselves as they attempted to 
extinguish a mock structure fire. The scenes produced by the HUAC in October 1947 were not 
all that different. Arguably, the HUAC’s friendly witnesses were the clowns of that circus. 








Historical truth is often stranger than commercial fiction. Indeed, the Walt Disney 
Company, a transnational multi-media behemoth that prides itself on its family-friendly 
branding, would hardly benefit from revisiting a time when its artists protested inequity. 
Reproducing the images of artists masquerading as shirtless, hooded executioners would do little 
to increase the WDC’s bottom line. Furthermore, Donald Duck was more than a mere cartoon 
character in the 1940s. He was an asset of the U.S. empire. In the hands of the Office of Inter-
American Affairs (OIAA), Donald became a symbol of imperialism that socialist critics would 
have sent back “feathers plucked and well-roasted,” if given a choice.428 This was the legacy left 
in Central and South America by Disney and his studio’s federal benefactors. 
During the 1940s, Walt Disney Productions, Ltd. (WDP) produced very little outside of 
its contributions to the OIAA, various federal agencies, and defense manufacturers. WDP 
pursued few creative ventures aside from Bambi (1942)—which did not make it past the first 
scene without the title character’s mother being murdered, Make Mine Music (1946)—a 
compilation of ten animated shorts, and the racially-insensitive Song of the South (1946). The 
lion’s share of labor performed in the House of the Mouse constituted productions that furthered 
U.S. foreign policy and aided the military-industrial complex. For Hollywood labor activists, 
Disney, the man, would be remembered as one of several moguls who invited racketeering 
schemes into their studios and thugs into their union halls. This made the assertion of their 
federally-recognized rights under the Wagner Act difficult, if not mortally dangerous. The Taft-
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Hartley Act was used to cut the left wing of Hollywood’s labor movement down to the quick 
after violence proved to be an ineffective deterrent. The congressional testimonies of Disney and 
his fellow right-wingers added insult to injury for artists of the motion picture industry. Walt 
Disney, the man, and The Walt Disney Company—an American institution—may have been 
separate entities, but their ideological underpinnings compelled this process of historical “in-
between” work. 
“King of Disneyland” 
Walt Disney’s personal empire of Disneyland, a theme park in Anaheim, California, 
opened in the sweltering heat of summer in the mid-1950s. On Disneyland’s opening day, a 
reporter asked him if he would be interested in running for political office. “Why would I want to 
be President of the United States,” Disney asked rhetorically, “I’m the king of Disneyland.”429 
Over the years, several prominent politicians and foreign dignitaries became invitees to Disney’s 
kingdom. Ronald Reagan donned a white tuxedo and mugged for the masses and cameras for 
Disneyland’s opening ceremonies.430 In June of 1959, the Nixon family joined Disney in 
christening his kingdom’s iconic monorail in.431 However, there were internal worries among 
Disney’s Imagineers that the monorail would burst into flames, or worse yet explode, but the 
Nixon family embarked on the attraction’s maiden voyage without incident.  
That same summer of 1959, just before then-Vice President Nixon and Nikita 
Khrushchev squared off in the Kitchen Debate, the Soviet First Secretary and his wife, Madame 
Nina Khrushchev were denied access to the “Happiest Place on Earth.” Although President 
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photo/ronald-reagan-dateline-disneyland/, accessed: January 2020, image used with permission of the Walt Disney 
Company. 
431 “Vice President Nixon Dedicates the Monorail at Disneyland,” June 14, 1959, The Disney Archives, URL: 
https://d23.com/this-day/vice-president-nixon-dedicates-the-monorail-at-disneyland/, accessed: January 2020, image 
used with the permission of the Walt Disney Company. 
125 
Eisenhower later suggested that it was the Soviets who rained on Khrushchev’s Main Street 
Electrical Parade, local law enforcement claimed that it “could not guarantee his safety.”432  
Either possibility was plausible. American heroes were always welcomed in the sanitized version 
of Walt Disney’s world. In 1984, Reagan had the distinguished pleasure of celebrating Donald 
Duck’s 50th birthday by honoring the character’s original voice actor, Clarence Nash, for his 
community service. Reagan and Nash were grinning from ear-to-ear, but the Donald Duck doll 
they were holding together at the podium appeared less enthusiastic. Although the Walt Disney 
Company has attempted to fashion itself as an apolitical institution over the years, its digital 
archives still tout its “Connections to Commanders-in-Chief” for the United States of 
America.433 
  Every day, tourists from all over the world are invited to walk where the Khrushchev 
dared not tread: Disney’s personal fiefdom in the former Orange Groves of Anaheim, California. 
When visitors have enter through the turnstiles and pass under one of two archways, a plaque 
mounted on the keystones declares, “Here you leave today and enter the world of yesterday, 
tomorrow and fantasy.”434 As most are keenly aware, the sensory experiences awaiting them on 
Main Street U.S.A. have been dutifully contrived. However, if these pilgrims to Disney’s magic 
kingdom have kept their eyes peeled, then they may even spot the dedication plaque which 
strikes a more personal tone: 
To all who come to this Happy Place: -WELCOME- Disneyland is your land. Here age 
relives fond memories of the past…and here youth may savor the challenge and promise 
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of the future. Disneyland is dedicated to the ideals, the dreams, and the hard facts that 
have created America…with the hope that it will be a source of joy and inspiration to all 
the world.435 
 
Decades after Disney’s passing, the Walt Disney Company (WDC) continues to honor one of its 
founder’s legacies and prides itself on ensuring that “the ideals, the dreams, and the hard facts 
that have created America” remain those of the consumer-friendly variety.  
If the executives of the WDC ever take suggestions on how to re-Imagineer their blended 
narratives of corporate and U.S. history, then several come to mind. Hopefully, the following 
few will suffice. Although no one would be lining up for Mr. Babbitt’s Wild Ride, they could 
have at least pinned a union button prominently on Goofy’s suspenders or Donald Duck’s naval 
uniform. Splash Mountain—a flume ride based on a minstrel show and featuring nearly all the 
characters from Disney’s Song of the South—should probably just be demolished. No one should 
be laughing in that place. While they are at it, they could update the historical interpretations 
presented in the Hall of Presidents, featuring Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon. While the 
twenty-first century has presented the Walt Disney Company with myriad opportunities to move 
beyond the criticisms of Mike Wallace’s “Mickey Mouse History,” the corporation’s attitudes 
toward labor-management relations and Ideological Imagineering have shown little change over 
time.436 
A Casting Call for U.S. Labor 
Despite the Walt Disney Company’s pioneering achievements in entertainment, 
didacticism, and the perpetuation of its consumer feedback loop—which consists of its films and 
television programming, merchandising, and the convergence of the two at its phenomenally 
successful theme parks—the corporation’s record on labor-management conflicts has remained 
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consistent. The facts remain that Disney, himself, actively worked to suppress labor organization 
at his studio in the mid-1930s and beyond. He did so by squelching the voices of artists and 
firing employees who attempted to form an independent union. Though Disney lost his 
protracted legal battle with one of his studio’s most animated labor leaders, he further justified 
his actions by banding together with his right-wing allies in Hollywood and hurling accusations 
of subversive activities at his ideological opponents. This was the legacy of Disney, the shrewd 
businessman, the Good Neighbor, the fervent supporter of the U.S. war effort, and friendly 
witness for the HUAC’s Hollywood inquiry. For all their faults, Walt Disney and the art 
produced at his cartoon factory are still considered national treasures. 
Sadly, Art Babbitt passed away in 1991, before Disney’s animation department 
experienced its renaissance period under artists like Tom Sito. Babbitt’s assistant, Bill Hurtz— 
the artist whose pay was none of Babbitt’s “goddamn business” per Disney—managed to get in a 
final dig during Babbitt’s burial at Forest Lawn Cemetery.437 Babbitt was laid to rest on a hill 
that overlooks the Disney studio below in Burbank. As Babbitt was a U.S. Marine, he received a 
twenty-one-gun salute during his graveside memorial. According to Sito, Hurtz was heard 
whispering: “If Art had his way, those guys would lower their rifles slightly.”438 Apparently, 
those who laugh last tend to laugh best. Though it should not be construed as another laughing 
matter, the WDC has continued to honor Walt Disney’s anti-unionism by exploiting its 
workforce in multiple sectors. As twenty-first century business has grown dependent on 
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information technology, Disney’s corporation has turned to sponsoring H-1B visas for foreign-
born employees in order to maintain its network infrastructure.439 
Additionally, evidence of economic disparity can still be found outside the Disney’s 
gates, or right on top of them, as is the case with the esplanade separating the Disneyland Resort 
from its sister theme park, Disney’s California Adventure. The outlook is rather bleak beyond the 
walls and fencing surrounding the “Happiest Place on Earth.” The WDC’s theme park and 
hospitality divisions have continually found strategies to avoid paying Disneyland and Walt 
Disney World “cast members” a living wage.440 For years, each and every morning in Anaheim, 
California, landscapers and custodial staff, mostly migrant laborers, power wash the sidewalks 
along Harbor Boulevard and shoo away members of the city’s homeless population. This is done 
to keep the resort area sparkling clean for the tourists who come to visit Disneyland. The 
company has denied culpability for any negative experiences that take place on Anaheim city 
property. The WDC, however, negotiates the contracts for laborers staffing more than a few 
Starbucks locations nearby. Suffice it to say, Disney’s engagement with labor-management 
relations has not improved over the years. 
The Media Empire’s New Groove 
In recent years, the WDC has continued to consume its industrial competitors virtually 
unabated, becoming an unstoppable force in the global mass-media market. The cultural exploits 
and sexual escapades of The Three Caballeros, however, were bankrolled by the federal 
government and became a proof of concept for Disney’s brand of cultural imperialism during the 
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1940s. Recently, Donald, José, and Panchito have been brought out of retirement for a new 
generation of global consumers. Recently, The Legend of the Three Cabarellos (2017) was 
produced for distribution in the Philippines.441 Donald has since received an honorable discharge 
from military service, “Joe” Carioca has given up cigar-smoking but remains as dapper as ever, 
and Panchito has holstered his guns and left his bandoliers behind.  
Disney has increasingly turned to acquisitions in order to control properties that threaten 
the global hegemony of the mass-media empire. In 2012, the company acquired George Lucas’ 
rights to the Star Wars franchise and oversaturated markets with “the force,” and most recently, 
“the Child.”442 In global terms, Disney’s profits were in excess of $11 billion, and that was only 
in theatres. By the end of 2019, the company controlled nearly the same market share of 
domestic box office profits (“33.2%”) as its closest three competitors—Warner Brothers 
(“13.7%”), Universal (“13.4%”), and Sony Pictures (“11.9%”)—combined.443 America and 
Hollywood’s “Free Enterprise System,” as touted by Ayn Rand, has allowed the WDC to simply 
consume its competitors.444 
In early 2019, the WDC bought out Twenty-First Century Fox and its entire back 
catalogue of intellectual properties, but the company’s acquisition of Marvel Comics has 
arguably had the most global impact.445 The wartime legacy of Marvel Comics and the WDC’s 
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unrivaled success in its creation of an entire cinematic universe had an explicit connection to the 
Disney studio’s own relationship to the federal government. In Captain America: The First 
Avenger (2011), Chris Evans, who assumed the titular role, became a super soldier, created by 
the U.S. military industrial complex in 1941 in order to fight the Nazis.446  Following Donald 
Duck’s nightmarish encounter with the Third Reich in Der Fuehrer’s Face, he felt compelled to 
serve his corporate overlord and government taskmasters. These fictional characters were born of 
the same militaristic ideology, prominent in the U.S. during the 1940s.  
As a transnational leviathan, the WDC has, most recently, turned its Hobbesian gaze to 
the digital realm. The company’s streaming service, Disney+, has become available to 
consumers all around the globe. The platform has brought many of Disney’s classic films and 
television programs out of the company’s proverbial vault, but it fails to provide viewers the 
necessary historical context to ethically and critically assess these productions. Dumbo, for 
example, was included in the initial offerings of Disney+. It also includes a disclaimer statement 
that the film was “presented as originally created. It may contain outdated cultural 
depictions.”447 Disney’s Song of the South, on the other hand, has yet to be sung on the WDC’s 
extremely popular streaming platform.  
Under the guise of multiculturalism, the WDC has continued to reap extraordinary levels 
of profit from films like The Princess and the Frog (2009), which included Disney’s first African 
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American princess, Marvel Studio’s Black Panther (2018) and a computer-generated remake of 
The Lion King (2019), featuring a more Afro-centric cast than its predecessor.448 Most of the 
characters who originally appeared in The Lion King (1994) were voiced by white actors and 
actresses. This had always been a peculiar aspect of the Disney film that appropriated regional 
folklore and depicted the untamed wilds of the African savannah. Notwithstanding the spirited 
anticipation for and reception of the twenty-first century films listed above, Uncle Remus, Brer 
Rabbit and the “tar baby,” have remained immovable objects. “Wakanda forever,” indeed.449  
Spoiler alert! In Avengers: Endgame (2019), Evans retired “America’s ass,” but not 
before he gifted his red, white, and blue “vibranium shield” to a Black superhero.450  As Captain 
America passed his star-spangled buckler to the African American Avenger, he also revealed 
what he had been up to after he saved the universe by travelling through time to ensure the 
integrity of the past was preserved—the film was science fiction of course. The Captain 
explained that he chose to live out the rest of his days with his paramour during the mid-
twentieth century, before the era of Jim Crow had ended. In July 2019, following Avengers: 
Engame’s theatrical release, Marvel Studios and the WDC, had reportedly crossed the threshold, 
a modest $2.79 billion in worldwide ticket sales, making it the most successful motion picture in 
the history of the industry.451 Although the film shattered box office records, turning profits from 
imperialist propaganda, with murky racialized politics, is all in a day’s exploitative labor at the 
Walt Disney Company. 
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